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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Information, Parenting, and Wages
Since the work of Akerlof (1970), economists have studied the role of infor-
mation in a wide range of contexts. When agents have imperfect information, their
expectations and the uncertainty that they face are of paramount importance. In
this thesis, I consider the role of information in three related contexts.
In Chapter 2, I explore a particular issue related to imperfect information and
human capital investment. I apply a framework of investment under uncertainty
to parents’ decision to invest their time in their children’s human capital. A large
literature in economics, dating back to Becker and Tomes (1979), uses a frame-
work where parents invest in their children to describe outcomes such as fertility,
intergenerational transmission, and intrahousehold allocations of resources. In this
framework parents’ attitudes towards risk and the uncertainty that they face regard-
ing their children’s outcomes should affect their decisions to invest in their children’s
human capital. But almost none of the work in any of these areas takes this idea
seriously.
Chapter 2 shows that parents’ risk preferences are an important determinant
of the time that they spend with their children. I develop an illustrative model
which shows that parents who are more tolerant of risk should invest more heavily
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in early childhood, and also proportionately more in early than in late childhood.
I then use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which contains measures
of risk preferences for parents as well as multiple measures of parental time with
children over childhood, to show that parents’ time use follows the predicted pattern.
Moreover, parents’ time use follows this pattern more clearly for categories of time
use which are more related to human capital investment.
In Chapter 3, I consider another aspect of information, this time in the context
of the labor market. Gibbons and Katz (1991) make the argument that when workers
are laid off, employers are implicitly sending a signal that these workers are of low
quality, since these workers and not others were chosen to be laid off. In empirical
work, they show that laid off workers in fact suffer larger wage losses than their
colleagues whose entire companies shut down. They dub this the “lemons effect.”
Recent work suggests that some human capital is specific to particular tasks (e.g.
Lazear (2009); Gathmann and Schönberg (2010)) rather than equally useful for any
job. If this is true, the lemons effect might be larger in magnitude for workers
who end up reemployed in jobs with similar task requirements. Using a definition
of similarity between jobs from Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) and measures of
occupational task content from Autor (2013) I provide some evidence on this point.
I also find evidence that any measure of the Gibbons and Katz lemons effect
should be interpreted with some caution. I show that “recall bias” affects estimates
of the lemons effect. Workers are more likely to forget being laid off if they find
reemployment quickly at a good wage. By contrast, workers whose plants closed
down do not appear to forget layoffs at all. The measured recall bias comes entirely
2
from workers reporting layoffs three years ago, for whom this bias is most important.
Thus, the work that measures the lemons effects using retrospective data should be
interpreted with caution.
In the remainder of this section, I put the work in Chapters 2 and 3 into a
broader context. Section 1.2 describes trends in the economics literature related to
parenting. This includes progress on estimating aspects of children’s human capital
development as well as work that attempts to understand how parents allocate
resources to their children. Section 1.3 describes how economists’ understanding
of human capital has evolved over the last two decades, with particular emphasis
on exactly what makes up human capital, how employers predict their workers’
productivity, and how employers learn about productivity in labor markets.
1.2 Understanding Parenting Behavior: Recent Work
Parents’ childrearing decisions affect their children’s development. Parents of
differing socioeconomic backgrounds choose to raise their children in different ways.
By a range of measures, children of parents with higher education and income have
significant advantages in life. The literature on the intergenerational transmission of
income suggests that children of wealthy parents tend to be wealthy as well, and that
at least part of this association is due to parenting (Black and Devereux (2011)).
Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson (2002) show that children of wealthier parents appear
to respond better to negative health shocks and have better health in adulthood.
They also receive more investments from their parents. In particular, Guryan, Hurst,
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and Kearney (2008) show that more educated parents spend more time with their
children in a range of activities. Parents also choose different levels of market inputs
for their children. Lino (2012) shows that, unsurprisingly, wealthier parents spend
more on a variety of child inputs. Children of higher socioeconomic status parents
also likely receive better genetic endowments. Holmlund, Lindahl, and Plug (2011)
attempt to determine how much of the intergenerational correlation in educational
attainment is due to the causal effect of parental education on children’s education
and how much is due to inherited genetic endowments. While analyses of twins
and adopted children can apportion some of the correlation to genes, a substantial
fraction of the correlation can be explained by parents’ education. Thus, there are
important differences by education in how parents raise their children which affect
children’s outcomes.
There is also a range of direct evidence on the effects of parental inputs on
children’s outcomes, though much of this work relies on questionable identifying
assumptions. Fiorini and Keane (2012) estimate a variety of models of the produc-
tion of children’s skills using a large number of measures of parental inputs, and
find that educational time with parents is consistently one of the most important
inputs. Villena-Rodán and Ŕıos-Aguilar (2012) use instruments based on women’s
opportunity cost of time to show that an increase in maternal time in educational
activities produces a substantial increase in children’s test scores. And Bernal and
Keane (2011) use instruments based on the generosity of welfare benefits at the state
level over time to determine the effect of mothers working on the test scores of their
young children. Both find that parental investments have a positive effect on test
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scores.
While a very large literature in economics attempts to look at the effects of
various factors on children’s human capital formation and outcomes, parental deci-
sions in their own right have received relatively less attention. Parents’ decisions are
fundamental to a number of important areas of economic research. One example of
this is the work on intergenerational transmission of economic status. In a model
of this sort (see Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) for example), parents choose to
either consume out of their wealth or to invest it in their children’s human capi-
tal. The more parents choose to invest, the larger the intergenerational correlation
in income. Models of intergenerational transmission typically include a single pa-
rameter common to all parents which indexes preferences for investing in children
relative to own consumption.1 To the extent that economists are interested in inter-
national (Björklund and Jäntti (2009)) or intertemporal (Aaronson and Mazumder
(2008)) comparisons in the intergenerational correlation coefficient, it’s important
to understand these preferences more deeply.
Parental decision-making is also important for the interpretation of any evalu-
ation of public policy interventions on the behalf of children. In dynamic models of
childrearing such as those in Todd and Wolpin (2003), Cunha and Heckman (2007),
or Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), parents choose inputs depending on the
returns to investment in a given period. To the extent that returns to investments
exhibit dynamic complementarity,2 a beneficial public policy intervention has two
1See e.g. Solon (1999) or Solon (2004).
2Dynamic complementarity, as defined by Cunha and Heckman (2007), is the concept that
higher levels of investment in one period raise the productivity of investment in later periods.
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effects on children. First, it has a direct effect on raising children’s skills in the
current period. But it also might make parents more willing to invest in the future,
as the returns to their future investments increase as well. It is also possible that
parents would see the public inputs into their children as a substitute for their own
efforts. In either case, the long term impacts of any sort of intervention need to be
interpreted as net of parental investment responses.
Despite this importance to a range of economic issues, the decisions of parents
are relatively poorly understood. This is no doubt largely because of the difficulty
of modelling parents’ decisions and in obtaining detailed information on parental
inputs. In considering family decision-making, issues of intrahousehold allocations
often have important implications for investments. Theoretical predictions of in-
trahousehold allocations depend on to what extent utility is transferable within a
couple and the relative importance of assortative mating.3 They also depend on the
(difficult to observe) relative preference of each household member for child inputs
compared to other goods.
Another difficulty comes from the fact that we often have very coarse measures
of household characteristics relevant for how preferences and budget constraints af-
fect decisions. We easily observe characteristics like parental education and income,
and we observe outcomes such as fertility, children’s test scores, and whether chil-
dren graduate from college. But even determining the causal relationship between,
say, family income and children’s test scores (as in Dahl and Lochner (2012)) leaves
the family’s decision-making process as largely a black box. Income might increase
3See Behrman (1997).
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test scores either because the income elasticity of child production is positive or be-
cause credit constraints are lifted for a particular set of families. To make progress
on these issues requires a clear theoretical framework and clear measures of parental
inputs.
An important question in the attempt to understand how parents raise their
children is whether parents view their investments and their children’s human capital
endowments as complements or substitutes. Becker and Tomes (1976) and Behrman,
Pollak, and Taubman (1982) show that if parents care about the total absolute
material well-being of their children, they will invest the most resources in the
most able children, who have the highest marginal return on investment. But say
parents’ preferences over the outcomes of multiple children are concave, and parents
care about children’s earnings differently than their bequests.4 Then, they would
prefer two children to have modest but equal outcomes over a larger but unequal
distribution of outcomes.
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982) use a structural model of the joint
determination of twins’ income and education, and find that parents provide more
education to the twin with poorer economic prospects. In important recent work,
Aizer and Cunha (2012) look at whether mothers exhibit more warmth towards one
of their children, as a function of “unexpected” birthweight endowments.5 They
find that mothers invest more in the heavier, better endowed child, which provides
4If parents had concave preferences but did not care whether children received their income
through earnings or bequests, then parents would invest in each child until the marginal produc-
tivity of investments were equal, and compensate the less well endowed child with transfers.
5They use controls including pre-natal visits to the doctor and smoking during pregnancy to
compare realized birthweight to what might be expected given measured maternal investments.
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evidence that investments are reinforcing. Hsin (2011) finds that this behavior
depends on parental income: using data from the PSID, she shows that poorer
mothers invest more in higher birthweight children, while richer mothers invest
more in lower birthweight children, suggesting that compensating investments might
happen at high wealth levels. Datar, Kilburn, and Loughran (2010) show that higher
birthweight children are more likely to receive investments including breast-feeding,
immunizations, and preschool enrollment compared to their siblings. While the
evidence thus far seems to suggest that parents invest more in children with higher
endowments, it is far from conclusive. And the existence of heterogeneity in these
behaviors, as suggested by the work of Hsin (2011), certainly begs further inquiry.
Another important question on which little empirical evidence exists is whether
and to what extent public investments in children crowd out private ones. Becker
and Tomes (1976) argue that the fact that parental and public investments are
substitutes explains some of the difficulty in increasing human capital levels of dis-
advantaged children. Parents do not need to invest as much in their children if the
state will provide some of that investment. And thus rather than raising investment
levels, public investments in human capital might crowd out private ones.
A small amount of direct empirical evidence actually suggests that the opposite
might be the case, but more work is needed. Some very important recent evidence
on this point from Gelber and Isen (2011) suggests that the Becker and Tomes
story does not explain parents’ reaction to public investments. Gelber and Isen
show that parents of children who are randomized into Head Start as part of the
Head Start Impact Study are more involved in their children’s lives in general.
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The work which suggests that children’s stock of human capital at a given age
and investment are complements (e.g. Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010)),
also provides some indirect evidence on this point. In this framework, consider
the situation where public investment completely crowed out private investment
today. If public investment was provided at a higher level than parents would have
provided, children would have higher stocks of human capital tomorrow. And since
investments in children with higher stocks of human capital are more productive,
parents would invest more tomorrow than without public investment. In a dynamic
sense then, even if public investment crowded out all private investment today, it
could still to generate both higher levels of children’s human capital and higher
private investment in the future. Much more work of the sort in Gelber and Isen
(2011), which directly links parental investments to plausibly exogenous changes in
public investments is warranted.
Another open question in the study of parenting involves ascertaining parents’
motivations for spending time with their children. Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney
(2008) show that parents who are more educated also spend more time with their
children. But Aguiar and Hurst (2007) show that more educated people tend to
spend more time at work and less time in either home production or leisure. Thus
parental time with children does not have the same relationship to parental edu-
cation as either leisure or home production. One explanation for this relationship
is that parents view time with their children primarily as an investment. More
educated parents also tend to hold higher levels of most assets.6
6See e.g. the Survey of Consumer Finance: Bricker, Kennickell, Moore, and Sabelhaus (2012).
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At the same time, it would be incredible to argue that parents don’t enjoy
spending time with their children. Indeed, Krueger, Kahneman, Schkade, Schwarz,
and Stone (2008) develop measures of people’s flow utility while performing a range
of activities. They find that spending time with children is consistently rated as
one of the parents’ most enjoyable activities. Thus while the aggregate relationship
between parental education and time with children is consistent with an invest-
ment story, parents do get some pleasure out of raising their children. Ascertaining
parents’ motives for making their parenting decisions is a question of first order
importance, but remarkably little systematic evidence is available on the subject.
Part of the reason for the lack of evidence on parental motivations is the
difficulty of disentangling the various motives in parental decisions. In addition
to the fact that investments in children at different points in time are not perfect
substitutes, parents trade off time along several important dimensions in a given
time period. When parents use their resources and energies to raise their children,
they face a contemporaneous tradeoff between work, leisure, and spending time
with children. Because market inputs might be a (perhaps imperfect) substitute for
parental time, the returns to parental time inputs are particularly difficult to identify.
When parents spend more time at work, they spend less time with their children but
also earn more, and likely purchase more market inputs. Thus an estimate of (for
example) how maternal work affects the outcomes of infants will make maternal work
look less deleterious, as any negative effects are in part ameliorated by increased
market inputs. This will be a problem for identification unless it is possible to
perfectly control for market inputs or use a valid instrument. And even a valid
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instrument for maternal time with children will not be able to disentangle the extent
to which market inputs mediate the relationship.
The other important empirical challenge in estimating the impacts of parental
inputs is that children’s skills and abilities are produced through a dynamic process.
The effect of improved school quality in fourth grade depends on a child’s skills
and abilities at that time. And these in turn depend on past inputs and initial
endowments.7 In the case of randomized interventions, it is still possible to estimate
the effect of improved school quality in a particular grade on outcomes, conditional
on children’s previous inputs. Most easily available data sets often require the strong
assumption that investment levels today are the same as all previous investment
levels.8
One strand of literature has attempted to solve this problem by estimating
ever more detailed models of dynamic parental inputs and child development. Todd
and Wolpin (2003) were one of the first to estimate a model like this. Cunha and
Heckman (2008) estimate a similar model using the Children of the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth and a dynamic factor model. Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach (2010) extends this work to consider more general constant elasticity of
substitution production functions. This strand of work requires repeated measure-
ments of children’s underlying “abilities” and enough detail on parental investments
over time that all inputs are measured.
One empirical strategy which can be useful to address the issue of unobserved
7See e.g. Todd and Wolpin (2003).
8See the discussion in Todd and Wolpin (2003). Under this assumption, the estimated impacts
of increased investments pick up higher investment trajectories over childhood.
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child backgrounds is family fixed effects. While many aspects of a home environment
are shared between siblings, eligibility for public programs at a given age could vary.
By comparing differences in outcomes within a family for whom a program only
applied to a subset of the children, we can learn about the effect of a program. For
example, this is the strategy that Currie and Thomas (1995) as well as Aizer and
Cunha (2012) use to identify the impact of Head Start on children’s outcomes. The
implicit assumption is that siblings are on average of similar endowment and receive
similar inputs, except for the intervention of interest.
But controlling for household level effects by comparing siblings within the
same household can also be problematic. Using variation in inputs within the house-
hold relies on the assumption that parents’ investments in their children are indepen-
dent of children’s characteristics. This assumption is problematic, since Becker and
Tomes (1976) show that parents will maximize their utility by making the invest-
ments in their children that are most productive. Thus if better endowed children
are more receptive to parental investments, parents will invest more in their better
endowed children. That the better endowed child receives higher levels of other
investments might bias estimates of the returns to various other programs. Alterna-
tively, it is possible that parents care about the equality of their children. Indeed,
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982) provide some evidence using American twins
that this appears to be the case.
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) show, using data from China, that comparing
households which have a twin versus a single birth at higher parity does not consis-
tently estimate the effect on older children of sharing resources amongst additional
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siblings. Twins are of lower birthweight, have lower APGAR scores, and are more
likely to have trouble breathing than singleton births. So if parents reinforce differ-
ences in endowments, then the older siblings of twins will receive more investment
than their low-endowment twin siblings. This will cause the tradeoff between the
quantity and quality of children to be underestimated. Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser
(2010) use a similar strategy in Israel and find little evidence of a quantity-quality
tradeoff. In general, the allocation of resources between children within a household
must be modelled. For example Aizer and Cunha (2012) show the degree to which
parental investments reinforce initial differences in ability is larger in larger families.
They also extend a simple household of the type considered by Becker and Tomes
(1976) to show that the quality-quantity tradeoff varies with family size. Families
who have more children feel their budget constraint more strongly, and hence invest
relatively more heavily in the most able children.
Birth order effects are another potentially problematic example of within-
household variation. Price (2008) provides evidence using a matching approach in
the American Time Use Survey that the oldest child in a household receives 20-30
extra minutes per day at a particular age, compared to their higher parity siblings.
And Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005) show that children born earlier to a given
set of parents attain higher levels of education. But it is very difficult to disentangle
to what extent birth order effects are due to biological differences by birth order,
parental preferences, or changes in parental skills as they gain experience.
Given the challenge of modelling parental decision-making, the work presented
in Chapter 2 of this dissertation makes an important contribution. I take a sim-
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ple yet unstudied implication of parental investment models, take it to its logical
conclusion, and then show its empirical relevance for explaining parental behavior.
This is important because it provides some direct evidence on why parents make
the parenting decisions that they do.
In particular, I show that parents’ risk preferences are an important deter-
minant of their time investments in their children’s human capital. The idea that
parents face uncertainty when they invest in their children’s human capital is fairly
obvious. Parents of young children do not know precisely how their children will
turn out. Nor can they be certain about the marginal impact of their actions on
outcomes. The important question here is to what extent this aspect of parental
preferences is important for investments.
To address this question, I develop a simple model of parental investment in
their children under uncertainty. Parents have simple mean-variance preferences
over their children’s outcomes. While children’s outcomes are uncertain, parents
opportunity cost of investment is certain. This reflects the fact that when parents
invest a dollar or hour in their child, they could have used that time for leisure or that
dollar for consumption, each of which has a certain value. And I assume that early
child represents a high-risk, high return investment while late childhood represents
a lower-risk, lower return investment.9 I show that more risk tolerant parents will
invest more than their risk averse peers in all-important early childhood. I also
show that they should optimally “tilt” their age-investment profile from late to
9While Cunha and Heckman (2007) survey a variety of evidence suggesting that early childhood
is a more productive time for investment, the higher risk of early investment is a maintained
assumption. I provide a more full discussion of this assumption in Section 2.2.
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early childhood.
I then test these empirical implications using data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID collected two very detailed pieces of informa-
tion that I exploit in this work. First, it collects a measurement of parents’ risk
aversion by asking about a series of hypothetical gambles. Second, as part of the
Child Development Supplement, the PSID also collects time diaries for each child
under the age of 12 as of 1997. It also collects these time diaries again for these
same children again in 2002, so that there is a panel of parental time investments for
each child. I show that parents who are one standard deviation more risk tolerant
spend about 25% more time doing “educational” activities with their children who
are four years old or under.
This work has several implications. First, and I would argue most importantly,
this work contributes to our understanding of how parents make the decision to
invest in their children. This should help economists think about other interventions
in child development, intergenerational transmission, and the decisions that families
make.
Another implication is that it implies an empirically relevant and easily im-
plementable change to the often estimated structural models of parental investment
and child development. These models should explicitly account for parental risk
preferences. But fortunately, both the PSID and the C-NLSY have information on
risk preferences which could be used for this purpose. Gayle, Golan, and Soytas
(2011) even include parental risk aversion in a model of parental investment and
labor force participation, but do not use the detailed risk preference data available
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in the PSID.
Finally, the result that parents’ risk preferences matter so strongly for their in-
vestment decisions suggest two directions for future inquiry. First, Chapter 2 leaves
implicit the source of parental uncertainty about the effects of time investments. I
think future work understanding the risks that parents face could be useful. This
work could estimate the risks that parents face by looking at the distribution of
children’s outcomes, conditional on parental inputs. Indeed work similar to Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro (2005), which estimates the ex ante risk faced by individuals
investing in their own schooling, could be profitably and easily extended to parental
investment decisions. This area might also be ripe for some work which tries to elicit
parental beliefs directly. A few simple survey questions could elicit parents’ beliefs
about their children’s likely outcomes and either corroborate my results or not.
Depending on the findings of this line of work, it’s possible that there are
a class of informational interventions which could in principle be extraordinarily
cost effective at raising parental investment, utility, and children’s outcomes.10 If
there are many different ways to raise children (as evidenced by the thousands
and thousands of books on topics related to parenting), parents might face either
significant costs to understand the true best parenting practices, or significant utility
costs from the risks borne because they don’t know the best way to parent. An ideal
parental intervention might change parents’ information sets so that they face less
risk. As risk averse people, this would increase their welfare. It would also increase
10The potential utility gains from reducing parental uncertainty are large. By introspection,
parents certainly “worry” a lot about their children. To the extent that this worry represents at
least in part a flow of disutility of uncertainty about children’s future outcomes, decreasing the
amount that parents worry could potentially be very valuable.
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their investments in their children, as they would bear lower investment costs. The
potential effectiveness of these interventions does depend on both the difficulty of
actually affecting parents’ information sets, and the fact that the risk parents face
must be due at least in part not to inherent randomness in childrearing but to a lack
of knowledge. But the large size of gains, at costs much lower than those of most
social investments in children’s human capital, make preliminary research worth
undertaking.
In the following paragraphs, I briefly turn attention to my own outlook on
the future of economic research that studies parenting decisions. The discussion
does not follow directly from any of my work above, but briefly discusses related
directions in current and future research.
An increasing number of papers in the last several years have longitudinally
linked administrative databases in order to study longterm outcomes. For example
Chetty, Friedman, Hilger, Saez, Schanzenbach, and Yagan (2011) link data from
the Tennessee STAR classroom experiment, where students were randomly assigned
to classes of reduced size, to administrative earnings records. While this paper in
particular provides important evidence on the effect of class size on children’s human
capital development and future wages, the prospects of this type of research for the
understanding of parenting are still largely untapped. The big benefit of this type
of work is that it is possible to link inputs at a particular stage of development to
the true outcomes of interest. Most current work only links inputs to intermediate
outcomes such as test scores.11 I expect this trend to continue and broaden to other
11See e.g. Villena-Rodán and Ŕıos-Aguilar (2012) or Bernal and Keane (2011).
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types of administrative data and other contexts. The ability to trace effects with
high accuracy and large sample sizes over large swaths of an individual’s life course
cannot help but produce new insights.
The other strategy to deal with the problem that investments in children
take a long time to come to fruition is to use survey measures of adult outcomes
either as a part of a long term general purpose panel (like the PSID) or a long term
specific purpose panel (like the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS)).12
However this work is limited to topics covered by large, costly surveys. Even still,
this strategy has not yet been carried fully to its fruition using existing data sets.
Children in the PSID-CDS were born between 1985 and 1997, and so now range in
age from 16-28. As these children grow, a valuable new source of rich data will be
able to trace the effects of parental investments through to adulthood. For example,
high quality recent work including Bernal and Keane (2011) and Villena-Rodán and
Ŕıos-Aguilar (2012) uses well-conceived identification strategies to look at the effects
of mothers working and mothers’ time with children on test scores. In the future,
these sorts of studies will be able to be extended to examine more distant outcomes
including wages, graduation rates, incarceration rates, and other adult outcomes.
While there will always be an important role for research related to the effec-
tiveness of public policies, the persistent concern in this work is how to generalize
from a particular policy context to predict the effect of future policies. Understand-
ing how parental investments react to changes in public investments is an important
12Cunha and Heckman (2008) and Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) are examples of
work which does this.
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aspect of this relationship. Because parents may respond to any change in external
investments in their children, its crucial to understand this relationship in order
to think about the validity and stability of results like those in Chetty, Friedman,
Hilger, Saez, Schanzenbach, and Yagan (2011).
I expect that more work will follow the recent progress in Aizer and Cunha
(2012) and Gelber and Isen (2011) in this area. This work provides important
insight into parents’ preferences. One approach to these sorts of problems involves
looking at the effect of large scale interventions using general purpose panel surveys.
The effects of large policy changes such as the introduction and roll-out of nation-
wide school reforms including No Child Left Behind might be measured using the
PSID. Another approach could use administrative records to look at the effect of
teacher value added on measures of future parental involvement including perhaps
parent-teacher conference attendance.
I think the approach in Aizer and Cunha (2012), which essentially uses a
control function to separate children’s endowments into expected and unexpected
components, can also be applied more broadly. Aizer and Cunha (2012) look at
the unexpected birthweight endowment when children are born, but this approach
could be extended to measures of test scores later in childhood. While this approach
is inherently based on parametric assumptions, it can be applied to the rich panel
data sets where the inclusion of a rich set of controls along with careful modelling
are the most defensible. It appears that the effect of parental income on children’s
outcomes might decrease with children’s age, so it is reasonable that the degree
to which parents compensate or reinforce endowment differences might vary over
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childhood as well.13 It is important to understand the direction and magnitude of
parental reactions since they might either reinforce or dampen policy interventions.
1.3 Wage Setting and Lemons
The other substantive chapter in this dissertation, Chapter 3, focuses not on
the genesis of human capital in childhood, but rather on how it is understood and
valued in the labor market. The vast majority of wealth in the modern world is held
in the form of human capital. Christian (2010) estimates that the market component
of human capital in the United States was worth over $200 trillion in 2009. The
value of these assets comes from people’s ability to earn wages in the labor market,
producing goods or services of value. Literature in economics going back to the work
of Becker (1975) breaks down human capital into a general component, which could
be equally productive for any firm, and specific component, which is productive only
for a worker’s current job. A sprawling body of work since Becker has fleshed out
and applied these ideas throughout the labor market.
One particular way that Becker (1975)’s work has been expanded is to put in-
creasing detail on the dichotomy between specific and general human capital. Rather
than human capital which is either specific to a single firm or general to all firms,
this body of work argues that general human capital is general only to the extent
that firms share particular characteristics. Neal (1995) studied how the reemploy-
ment outcomes of workers displaced from their firms depended on their industry
of reemployment. If human capital was only either specific to a firm or general to
13See Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues (2011), for example.
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any firm, then reemployment wages should be similar no matter whether workers
stayed in the same industry or not. To the extent that firm-specific human capital is
important and is accumulated over time on the job workers should experience wage
losses that are increasing in their tenure at their previous job which do not depend
on whether the worker stays in the same industry or not. But in fact Neal (1995)
found when workers were displaced but remained in the same 2 digit industry, their
wage losses depended half as strongly on tenure as those who switched industries.
This suggests that workers who were displaced but remained in the same industry
were able to transfer more of their skills to their new jobs. Skills of this sort are
neither specific only to a firm nor general to any firm, but are specific to the set of
firms within an industry.
Another piece of evidence from Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) suggests
that human capital might importantly be specific to a worker’s occupation, rather
than her industry. The authors use the PSID to observe workers as they change
their firm, industry, and occupation, and find that there are substantial returns to
occupational tenure. They also find that after controlling for occupational tenure,
there are no longer returns to working at the same firm or in the same industry.
Shaw (1984) attempts to construct a measure of experience which accounts for
previous employment in similar occupations. She argues that occupations with
many mutual job transitions require more similar skills. She then shows that a
measure of experience which weights prior experience by transition-based similarity
predicts wage growth over workers’ careers better than pure experience measures.
The fact that workers can develop skills which are productive in some jobs but
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not others suggests that there is an important role for an aspect of worker’s human
capital which is neither fully generally applicable across jobs nor completely specific
to a single job. Lazear (2009) develops a theory of a “skill weights” approach to
human capital which explains this phenomenon. In his formulation, workers have
differing amounts of different skills, which are the ability to perform different tasks.
Skills are completely “general” in that they aid in the performance of a given task
at any job. And a particular job requires the performance of a particular bundle of
tasks. But because each job requires a different mix of tasks, a substantial portion
of human capital will appear specific to a particular firm or job. Lazear’s idea is
compelling in that it provides a clear and concise explanation of the empirical results
discussed above.
Several recent papers attempt to operationalize this concept and find that task
specific human capital is able to explain observed patterns in the labor market which
can’t be described with Becker’s theory. Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) extend
Lazear’s model to allow for returns to experience in performing a particular bundle
of tasks which is useful in other jobs to the extent that they require similar tasks.
Gathmann and Schönberg use the German Qualification and Career Survey, which
is a survey of employees carried out by the German Federal Institute for Vocational
Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung; BIBB) and the Research Institute of the
Federal Employment Service (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung; IAB).
This survey asks workers not just for their occupational title, but whether and to
to what extent they must perform any of 19 different tasks in their job. Gathmann
and Schönberg’s task model predicts that workers who change jobs earlier in their
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career are relatively more likely to make transitions to jobs requiring different skill
mixes. This prediction is born out in the German data. Their measure of task
specific human capital is able to explain explain about half of wage growth over
worker’s careers in the data.
In the United States, there is no survey data on the tasks performed by individ-
uals. The closest approximation comes from using information from the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (DOT) or the Occupational Information Network (O*NET),
which provide information about the work involved in detailed three digit occupa-
tions.14 Autor, Murnane, and Levy (2003) use the DOT to quantify the extent
to which each occupation requires the performance of tasks which are routine and
non-routine, as well as cognitive, manual, and interactive. Poletaev and Robinson
(2008) use the same DOT data and address a very similar issue to Neal (1995) using
factor analysis. They identify the principal skill components used in occupations
based on the task categories in the DOT. Then, in addition to considering how
reemployment wages vary with the change of industry or occupation upon reem-
ployment, Poletaev and Robinson look at how wage outcomes depend on whether
the new job has a different first or second principal component. The authors find
that 4 principal components are able to explain more than 70% of the variation
in the skill requirement of occupations. They define measures of the “distance” of
changes in the skill requirements in new jobs, which capture the intuition that even
if many workers change detailed occupations after displacement, many are still in
14For a discussion of the information included in DOT, see Autor (2013).
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jobs which employ roughly the same skills.15 Wage losses are more substantial for
workers who find jobs using different skills than for those who find jobs in different
occupations or industries.
In addition to explaining worker’s job transitions over their careers, wage
growth during voluntary job changes, and wage losses from displacement, the task
approach provides a parsimonious way to model differences between jobs. Yam-
aguchi (2012) develops a Roy (1951) model using a low dimensional skill vector
where workers have skill and preferences for each task. Yamaguchi is able to parsi-
moniously model a wide variety of occupation options by using their low-dimensional
task content from the DOT.
In the future, work in labor economics will likely integrate the idea of tasks
into a variety of different areas of inquiry. Tasks are both conceptually appealing
and parsimonious. One particular area where I expect tasks will gain traction is
in the understanding of employer learning and the role of information in the labor
market. I provide some tentative results in this direction in Section 3.2. Below I
discuss some of the trends in this literature.
It is crucial for employers to know how productive their employees are. In
complex production processes, where workers work in groups and produce outputs
whose quality is hard to observe, this is often a difficult task for managers. This
might suggest that incumbent employers know more about a worker’s productivity
than outside employers. Jovanovic (1979) develops a model along these lines, where
15They show that even using the 14 1-digit occupation codes, nearly 50% of their sample reports
changing occupations after displacement, but that using a skill-based definition of job, only 28%
of workers switch jobs.
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employers learn about workers’ (firm-specific) productivity over time. Because Jo-
vanovic models a firm specific match, employees who are found to be unproductive
leave to seek out higher wages, and wages rise with job tenure. Waldman (1984)
develops a model where incumbent employers know workers’ ability perfectly, high
ability workers have higher productivity in higher responsibility jobs, and outside
employers observe only workers’ assignments and not their actual productivity. Here,
employers under-promote high ability workers in order to keep their private infor-
mation.
There is a long literature which considers the implications of asymmetric in-
formation of this sort on employer behavior. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) argue
that employers have monopsony power because of their informational advantage,
and this allows them to profitably invest in general training. And work including
Golan (2005) considers how the incumbent and outside employers might engage in
bidding wars when one employer has superior information.
But the empirical literature has lagged behind the theoretical literature in
this area, most likely because of the considerable difficulties in measuring worker
productivity and employer information sets. Even so, there is a sizable body of work
attempting to measure employer learning through indirect methods. One important
distinction between strands of this work is whether employer learning is modelled
as symmetric or asymmetric between firms.
Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) test for the existence
of employer learning under the assumption that all learning which takes place is
completely public. These papers argue that as workers gain experience, their wages
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should be less correlated with easily observed proxies for productivity and more
correlated with factors unobservable to employers but correlated with productivity,
including test scores. Lange (2007) takes this idea further and quantifies the speed
at which employers learn about worker ability. Lange (2007) finds that firms have
learned about the vast majority of worker productivity over the first three years of
employment.
There is also work which finds a sizable role for asymmetric employer learning.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) estimate the “lemons effect” of being laid off by comparing
the reemployment wage outcomes of workers who were laid off to those whose plants
shut down. The assumption here is that by choosing to lay off a worker, employers
are revealing some of their private information about worker productivity. If em-
ployers had no private information, this lemons effect should not exist. Additional
evidence of asymmetric information is provided by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) in
the context of the German labor market. They show that workers drafted into the
military (exogenously) have higher wages than those who quit or are laid off.16 This
is consistent with asymmetric information because the workers who choose to leave
the firm are those who the incumbent firm knew were less productive, so outside
firms make accordingly lower wage offers.
Schönberg (2007) attempts to test for the existence of asymmetric versus sym-
metric information in two ways. First, she shows that among college educated
16They also show, intriguingly, evidence of monopsony power on the part of firms who keep their
apprentices. Workers who join the military are paid more than those who stay in their apprentice
firm. Workers who join the military are of average productivity since they are randomly selected,
while workers who remain in their firms are of above average ability since they were not laid
off. Acemoglu and Pischke argue that this fact is evidence that workers who remain with their
apprenticeship firms are paid below their marginal product.
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workers, AFQT scores are inversely related to the probability of making job-to-job
transitions. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction from the model of
Greenwald (1986) that movers are adversely selected. She also looks for asymmetric
information by testing whether the AFQT score increasingly determines wages over
tenure at a given firm, rather than over a worker’s career as in Farber and Gib-
bons (1996), and finds that learning appears mostly symmetric. Pinkston (2009)
finds that employer learning is mostly asymmetric, using a related test where he
argues that wages should be increasingly correlated with test scores within spans
of continuous employment rather than tenure at a particular firm. That Schönberg
and Pinkston have conflicting findings which depend crucially on assumptions about
how incumbent employers match outside wage offers suggest that more work needs
to be done, potentially using different empirical strategies. Zhang (2007) develops
a test for asymmetric information based on workers’ employment histories. If em-
ployers learned symmetrically about worker ability, then all employers will have the
same current state of knowledge and previous job mobility should not be related
to ability. Zhang finds evidence that the relationship between worker ability and
wages is stronger for workers who have experienced more job turnover. Kahn (2008)
also develops a test for asymmetric information between employers, which is based
on the variance of wage changes. Kahn shows significant evidence of asymmetric
information.
Most recently, work on employer learning has taken a turn towards a more nu-
anced view of the employment context. Indeed, it is incredible that a single measure
of worker “ability” is learned about uniformly by employers in every industry and
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occupation. Mansour (2012) shows that the speed of employer learning, as measured
by the Lange (2007) method, varies substantially between occupations. Light and
McGee (2012) use multiple components of the NLSY’s ASVAB tests combined with
skill importance data from O*NET to show that employers learn about different
skills in different occupations. Sometimes, for skills which are particularly impor-
tant to a firm’s production process, employers screen entrants on skills rather than
learn about them after hiring. Further complicating the matter, Kahn and Lange
(2010) use longitudinal administrative data from a particular firm which also in-
cludes measures of performance to understand exactly what employers learn about.
They find that employers are learning about a moving target: workers’ productivity,
as measured by performance reviews, changes heterogeneously over their careers.
There is much more valuable work to be done along the lines of these recent pa-
pers. While it is possible to estimate aggregate measures of the speed or importance
or symmetry of employer learning, these concepts are almost certainly dependent on
context. Evidence from firms with easily measurable outputs, as with the fruit pick-
ers of Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2009), would be useful to further disentangle
learning from heterogeneous human capital accumulation at least within a partic-
ular workplace context. Further work along the lines of Light and McGee (2012),
which recognizes that people have multidimensional abilities, and different employ-
ers care about (and learn about) these abilities in different proportions, would be
useful. One particular piece of low-hanging fruit would be to study learning about
workers’ non-cognitive skills.17 Personnel records which combine personality and
17Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) argue that non-cognitive skills are at least as important
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other batteries from the hiring process with panels of productivity measures and
wages might be useful in this regard.
In the longer term, I hope it will be possible to construct very comprehensive
measures of productivity from workers’ data trails. Textual analyses of emails, and
patterns in workers calendars hold the promise of measuring productivity in a very
fine way for many workers. For example, consider a worker who plans events of mod-
est size such as weddings or small conferences. Based on dates, places, and other
event parameters mentioned in emails or phone conversations, it should be possible
to see how much correspondence the employee used to plan the event. It should also
be possible to see when the correspondence began. Thus an analyst could produce
estimates of the time spent planning an event and hence of worker productivity.
Though these measures would be imperfect, they would permit very fine-grained
measurement of worker productivity. While privacy issues certainly present chal-
lenges for the analysis of such personal data for research purposes, much of the
data is already used for the arguably more invasive purpose of targeted advertising.
The use of this textual data for economic research is far from a reality: only in
the sphere of measuring political slant (e.g. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)) or in
measuring public mood (e.g. Bollen, Mao, and Zeng (2011)) have even rudimentary
patterns been gleaned from text. With measures of employee actions tied to actual
measures of firm inputs and production, patterns of employer learning can at least
be studied at the firm level.
for wages as cognitive skills, suggesting that they are also important for productivity and for
employers to understand.
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In this dissertation, I provide some suggestive new evidence on these points.
First, in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, I combine the task literature with the employer
literature. I revisit the Gibbons and Katz (1991) lemons effect measurements in-
corporating the idea of learning about task specific human capital. In particular,
I look at the task requirements of a displaced worker’s current and previous job.
I divide the space of all tasks into six categories, following Autor, Murnane, and
Levy (2003); Autor (2013), of routine and non-routine manual, cognitive, and in-
terpersonal tasks. I then create a measure of task overlap between the two jobs,
following Gathmann and Schönberg (2010). In this framework, I argue that if em-
ployers learn about general productivity, the lemons effect should not vary with task
overlap. But if employers learn about task-specific productivity, the lemons effect
should be smaller when workers find reemployment performing different tasks since
whether or not a worker is a lemon at a particular task is meaningless for their
performance of very different tasks. I show that, surprisingly, the lemons effect is in
fact larger when workers find reemployment in jobs requiring different task mixes.
This analysis is certainly imperfect: at it’s core it rests on the assumption
that the only systematic differences in wages between workers whose plants closed
down and laid off workers, conditional on observable characteristics, are due to the
informational effect of reason for displacement. This is an assumption which cannot
be verified. But Gibbons and Katz (1991) spawned a range of work using this
measure of adverse selection in the labor market. The value of Chapter 3 comes in
part from the fact that it tests the assumptions that underlie this growing body of
work.
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In the course of this work, I also show that “recall bias” is an important driver
of the measured lemons effect. Recall bias occurs when workers disproportionately
forget layoffs compared to plant closings if they were subsequently reemployed at
good wages. Since the lemons effect, which captures the degree of negative signal
faced by workers, is measured by comparing the reemployment wages of laid off
workers to those displaced by plant closings, this bias is of first order importance.
The recall bias pattern can be seen in the number of workers reporting each type
of displacement retroactively over different periods of time. Further, the measured
lemons effect is almost exclusively driven by workers reporting layoffs in the most
distant time period. I show that this recall bias story does not appear to be driving
the interaction of the effect of being laid off and taking a job with a different set of
skills.
While the work in Chapters 2 and 3 might seem somewhat unrelated, there
are common themes. Both chapters consider the decisions that agents make as a
primary object of study. Chapter 2 studies the risks and decisions that parents face
in raising children, while Chapter 3 considers how firms’ ability to learn about worker
productivity and their demand for workers to perform particular tasks interact to
generate adverse selection in the labor market. Both chapters use existing public
data in new ways to shed light on these topics. Chapter 2 combines parental time
diary data as a measure of investment with survey based measures of risk tolerance,
while Chapter 3 uses information on the task content of occupations and surveys
of displaced workers. In these two ways, the two remaining chapters fit together to
form a cohesive dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Uncertainty and Parental Investment in Children
2.1 Introduction
It is obvious to any parent that the time and energy spent raising children is
rewarding. But there is also evidence (e.g. Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008))
that parents view their children at least in part as an investment good. Investment
in risky assets depends on the expected returns, preferences for risk, and the risks
faced. Though there is a large literature that analyzes parental investments in
children, in both a theoretical and empirical context, little of this work explicitly
considers parents attitudes towards risk.
In this work, I take seriously the idea that parents’ attitudes towards risk and
the structure of risk matter for their investment in children, and I show that these
dependencies are empirically important. Using measures of parental risk tolerance
and measures of parental time investment over childhood from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), I show that risk preferences matter for time allocation.1
More risk tolerant parents spend more time with their children in early childhood.
In late childhood, the pattern reverses, and more risk tolerant parents spend less
time with their children.2
1In all analysis, I use a measure of relative risk tolerance which is adjusted for measurement
error according to the method of Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009a). Details on the measure
and adjustments can be found in Section .
2Due to data limitations, some of these empirical effects are estimated imprecisely. Yet point
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I develop an illustrative model that explains this behavior. Parents invest in
their children over two periods of childhood. Investment in early childhood is more
productive than investment in late childhood. It is also riskier. Investments over
childhood are (imperfect) substitutes (Cunha and Heckman (2008)) so that a given
level of human capital can be produced with different combinations of investments
in early and late periods. More risk tolerant parents choose more high risk, high
return investment in early childhood and less low risk, low return investment in late
childhood. They therefore “tilt” their time investments away from late childhood
and towards early childhood.
Krueger, Kahneman, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone (2008) estimate the flow
value of utility that people receive from doing particular activities. They find that
time that spending time with children is one of parents’ most enjoyable activities.
So parenting is in part a form of consumption. While there is no doubt that par-
ents enjoy raising their children, parents also appear to view their children at least
partly as an investment good. Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008) show that more
educated parents spend more time with their children. They discuss various in-
terpretations of this finding, a leading one being that time spent parenting is an
investment. In general time use patterns suggest that, compared to less educated
people, more educated people spend relatively less time in home production and less
time in leisure (Aguiar and Hurst (2007)). Thus if more educated parents spend
more time with their children, this is for reasons that are not related to either leisure
or home production.
estimates suggest substantial effects which can sometimes be bounded away from zero.
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There is a lot of work where it is assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that par-
ents invest in their children. Theoretical work where parents invest in children goes
back to Becker and Tomes (1979), who study the implications for intergenerational
mobility. Gayle, Golan, and Soytas (2011) estimate the returns to parental time
investment in children and find that the returns (in the form of educational attain-
ment) to parental time investments are higher for blacks than whites and for mothers
than fathers. In the course of estimating the technology of skill formation – how
parental investments produce children’s skills over childhood – Cunha, Heckman,
and Schennach (2010) account for the endogeneity of parental inputs by jointly esti-
mating the parental investment decisions as a function of children’s abilities. They
show that early childhood investments have a much larger effect on cognitive skills
than late childhood investments. Kalil, Ryan, and Corey (2012) show that more
educated parents spend relatively more time in “developmentally appropriate activ-
ities,” which is consistent with parents investing in their children, and more educated
parents paying more attention to the productivity of their time with children. While
these papers consider parental time with children as an investment, they pay little
attention to the role of uncertainty over the rate at which time investments produce
outcomes.
The uncertainty that parents face when investing in their children’s human
capital is likely substantial. There is evidence that investment in one’s own schooling
is a risky investment for individuals.3 The uncertainty that parents face when
3 It has been documented that the returns to investment in human capital are realized with
some significant uncertainty. Palacios-Huerta (2003) analyzes the human capital risk-return profile
with methods from finance. Shore, Barth, and Jensen (2010) estimate the income volatility that
individuals face in their careers, and show that it can be considerable. Cunha, Heckman, and
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investing in their children is necessarily even greater. To the extent that there are
aspects of a child’s circumstances at age 18, when they make the decision about how
much higher education to obtain, that are unknown to parents when children are
age four, then there is additional uncertainty. And of course the great challenge of
raising children means that even the most experienced parents aren’t completely sure
how much their actions help their children. Despite the evidence that uncertainty
must be important for parental investments in their children, it has been largely
ignored in the literature on parental investments.
In the empirical section of this chapter, I use the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics Child Development Supplement (PSID-CDS) time diaries and the PSID
Risk Tolerance Supplement to provide evidence on how parents’ time investment in
children depends on parental risk tolerance. The data include measures of both the
risk tolerance of the PSID sample respondent and how much time each parent spends
with each of up to two children in both 1997 and 2002. By using a sample of children
that was under 5 for the first time diary in 1997 and older in 2002, I can observe
parents’ investments over the course of childhood. Using the rich information on the
activity and who was present in the time diary data, I create detailed measures of
parental investment. Importantly, while risk tolerance is a fundamental parameter in
parents’ utility functions, I show that relative risk tolerance as measured in the PSID
is essentially uncorrelated with other family level observables. This is important for
Navarro (2005) decompose the ex-post uncertainty in returns to college into a component that
is predictable by individuals and the residual which represents uncertainty that faces individu-
als. They find that about 40% of the ex-post heterogeneity in returns to education represents
uncertainty faced by students. Work following Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) refined the
methods used, but to my knowledge no papers argue that students investing in their human capital
is unimportant.
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my analysis since I rely on the assumption that, conditional on observable control
variables, risk tolerance is uncorrelated with other unobserved family characteristics
that affect parental time with their children.
While the precision of my estimates is limited by a small sample size, I find
evidence that parents’ risk preferences are an important determinant of the time
that they spend with their children. The relationship between risk preference and
time use is consistent with a model where risk averse parents spend time with their
children as an investment in human capital. More risk tolerant parents spend more
time in educational activities with their young children. Parents who are one stan-
dard deviation more risk tolerant spend 28% (from 7 to 50% with 95% confidence)
more time in educational activities with their young children. By comparison, the
gap in educational time between families where the mother is a college graduate and
a high school graduate is about 30%, and the gap between families where the wife
does not and does participate in market work is about 50%. In overall time use and
recreational activities, more risk tolerant parents spend about 4% more time with
their children, and these estimates are not statistically significant. The effect of
risk tolerance being larger in magnitude for educational time, which is most clearly
related to human capital investment, is consistent with the model of investment. In
late childhood the patterns are different. Risk tolerance is no longer related to ed-
ucational time at all. And parents who are a standard deviation more risk tolerant
spend about 6% (−1% to 12%) less time with their children overall, and about 9%
(−1% to 19%) less time in recreational activities.
This evidence suggests that risk tolerance matters for parental time invest-
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ments, especially those in educational activities. The magnitudes of these effects,
while sometimes imprecise, are large and economically significant. The signs of some
of these coefficients vary throughout childhood in ways that might not be immedi-
ately obvious. For example, it doesn’t seem to be the case that more risk tolerant
parents just invest more in their children throughout childhood. Why might risk
tolerant families invest more time altogether in early childhood but less in late child-
hood? And why might risk tolerant parents spend more educational time with their
children in early childhood but a similar amount in late childhood?
In order to explain these stylized facts, I build a simple illustrative model that
represents parental decision making under uncertainty. Two periods of development
are necessary to generate different relationships between risk tolerance and invest-
ment over childhood and reflect the growing literature which underscores differences
in the productivity of investments over childhood and a lack of perfect substitutabil-
ity of investments over time (e.g. Almond and Currie (2011) and Cunha, Heckman,
and Schennach (2010)). Parents are uncertain about the effectiveness of their in-
vestments in their children. The more they invest in a given period, the more that
period’s investment contributes to the risk that they face. The risk of investment in
early childhood is greater than the risk in late childhood. In this framework, par-
ents can produce the same expected level of human capital in their children using
different combinations of time in early and late childhood, with different total time
costs and different risks.4
Using this framework, I consider how parental investment in children varies
4The model does not include non-time investments.
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over childhood by parental risk tolerance. Risk tolerance across parents affects
their behavior along two margins. First, consumption is certain, while the future
payoffs to investment in children’s human capital are uncertain. Therefore, more
risk tolerant parents will choose higher levels of investment throughout childhood.
More risk tolerant parents also change the composition of their investments over the
course of childhood. In particular, since investments in younger children are riskier,
but presumed to be more effective per unit of time, while investments in school-age
children are less risky but also less productive, risk tolerant parents will choose to
invest relatively more intensely in their young children and relatively less intensely
in their school-age children.
Before proceeding further, it is worth clarifying the nature of risk and uncer-
tainty that I am discussing here and how parental investments contribute to the risk
that they face. When parents decide to devote a unit of time to their child, they
give up the opportunity of using this time for a certain level of benefit. Parents
might have worked for an hour in the labor force or they might have engaged in an
hour of leisure. Each of these provides a certain benefit. But when they spend an
hour investing in their child, they aren’t sure exactly how much this investment will
improve their child’s prospects. As parents invest more in their children, they are
increasingly sacrificing certain utility in the form of wages and leisure for uncertain
children’s human capital. Thus the total uncertainty that they face increases as
they invest more in their children’s human capital.
There are several potential sources of this uncertainty which parents face.
It might be that children are of different types, so that some types of children
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will respond well to an investment while others don’t. For example, some children
might have a relatively higher capacity to learn reading skills. Children of this type
would by definition benefit more significantly from time spent reading together than
children of another type.5 To the extent that a child’s type is unknown to a parent,
this will make parents uncertain about the effects of reading to a child. Another
potential source of uncertainty is the price of skills in the labor market. Even if
parents knew exactly how much skill they would endow in their children from each
unit of investment, to ultimately realize the benefits of human capital, the children
would need to sell their skills in the labor market. But as can be seen from the
growth in the returns to college over the last three decades (see e.g. Acemoglu and
Autor (2011)), the price of skill can vary considerably between early childhood and
adulthood. A third potential source of uncertainty is that parents have a “skill” at
parenting, which is their specific rate at which a unit of their time instills human
capital, and parents are uncertain about this skill.
In Section 2.2, I introduce a simplified illustrative model of a parent investing
in a single child during two periods of childhood where uncertainty is present. This
model generates predictions that are consistent with the empirical work in Section
2.3. Section 2.3.1 discusses the PSID Child Development Supplement which includes
the time diary data used in this chapter as well as the PSID Risk Tolerance Supple-
ment which provides estimates of parental risk preferences. Section 2.3.2.1 shows
that risk tolerance is virtually uncorrelated with observable parental characteristics
5Children might also have unobserved “ability” types which make any sort of investment more
productive.
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and are thus is unlikely to be correlated with unobserved parental characteristics
either. I present the results of regressions of parental time investments on risk
tolerance in Section 2.3.2.2. I conclude in Section 2.4.
2.2 Illustrative Model of Uncertain Parental Investment
In this section I develop a simple illustrative model that can explain the pat-
terns in the data. In particular, this model explains why more risk averse parents
spend more time with their children in early childhood and less in late childhood.
Economic models of parenting go back to at least to Becker and Tomes (1979),
who model parents as choosing between their own consumption and investments in
their children’s human capital. A model of this sort, with only a single parental
investment, cannot fully capture parental responses to the varying productivity of
investments over childhood. Cunha and Heckman (2008) model parental invest-
ments in children over multiple periods of childhood and show that early childhood
investments are substantially more productive. They also note that investments
in early childhood raise the productivity of investment in late childhood, which
they term dynamic complementarity. I start with an illustrative model like that of
Cunha and Heckman with two periods of investment, and build in uncertainty over
the efficacy of inputs.
Consider a situation where a two parent household exogenously has a single
child. The child is young for one period, school-age for one period, and then child
services are realized. In each period, parents have H hours to divide between time
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investment in children and work. Parents receive wage w for hours spent work-
ing and purchase consumption when the child is young (c1) and/or school-age (c2).
Mothers and fathers are perfect substitutes for each other both in parenting and in
the labor force.6 Parents maximize a unitary joint utility function over consumption
and child services.7 Parents can borrow and lend freely at no interest, and discount
the future at rate δ. Parents choose time investment when children are young (y)
and school-age (s). These physical investments generate random levels of effec-
tive investment when children are young (Y ) and school-age (S). These effective
investments produce children’s labor market outcomes through a human capital pro-
duction function H. Parents have utility uc over children’s realized human capital
H. Thus parents’ problem can be written as:
max
c1,c2,y,s
u(c1) + δu(c2) + δ
2E [uc[H(Y, S)]| y, s] (2.1)
s.t. : y ≤ y ≤ H
s ≤ s ≤ H
c1 + c2 ≤ w(2H − y − s)
Note that y and s are also bounded from below by y and s in Equation (2.1).
This simplification captures the intuition that there are potentially two very differ-
6The assumption that mothers and fathers are perfect substitutes serves only to simplify the
analysis. Imperfect substitution would result in similar results holding for maternal and paternal
time separately.
7There is a long literature on the validity of the assumption of unitary households and intra-
household bargaining. As will become clear in Section 2.3.1.2, I only observe one measure of
risk tolerance per household, so unitary preferences greatly simplify the relationship between my
empirical measure of risk tolerance and the representative preferences of the household.
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ent domains of investment in children. At the low end, if parents are completely
neglectful and provide inadequate resources for their children, there are important
chances for child mortality. This is the domain that readers may initially consider
when they think about risk and parenting. To the extent that in reality parents
might have a completely different decision framework over these sets of outcomes, I
rule them out by assuming investments only affect the probability of them happening
with y < y and s < s.8
In order to explain the empirical regularity that more risk tolerant parents tilt
their investment profile, I need the risks of investment to be different for investments
in early and late childhood. This, combined with the assumption from Cunha and
Heckman that early investments are more productive gives parents a problem that is
similar in some ways to a portfolio allocation problem. Early childhood investment
is high risk and high return (like a stock) while investment in late childhood is low
risk and low return (like a Treasury bond). Just as more risk tolerant people invest
a greater share of their portfolios in risky assets as in (e.g. Breeden (1979), Kimball,
Sahm, and Shapiro (2008)), more risk tolerant parents will invest relatively more of
their total time investment in their children during early childhood.
Early childhood investments could reasonably be more risky for two differ-
ent reasons. First, different unobserved ‘types’ of children might create additional
uncertainty. Consider the situation where a child has a specific but unobserved
receptivity to investment, so that for some children a unit of investment is more
8It would be possible to use a single utility maximizing framework to encompass the entire range
of children’s outcomes, from untimely death to successful college graduate. But the assumption
that y and s are bounded from below, combined with the assumption of an interior solution, serves
to focus ideas for the present discussion.
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productive while for others it is less productive. If parents do not know the specific
productivity of their child, then this uncertainty represents a source of risk to them.
In a simple learning model, it is possible that as children age, parents learn about
this child-specific productivity of investment. As parents learn, this extra source of
risk disappears, and the risk of investment decreases.9 Another mechanism which
could create decreasing risk with age is that parents face uncertainty over the price
of the skills that they transmit to their children in the labor market. If parents knew
exactly how productive their investments were in terms of generating skills, but did
not know the price of these skills in the labor market, then early investments would
be very uncertain. When a child is two years old, there are still 16 years until he
or she would graduate high school and potentially enter the labor force. When the
child is age 12, there are only another 6 years. To the extent that the price of skills
is more precisely forecastable less far in the future, the risk that parents face will
be decreasing as their children age.
I assume that realized human capital investments are distributed with mean
given by the investment level chosen by parents (y, s) and a variance that is pro-
portional to the investment level. That is, (Y, S) are distributed with mean and
variance given by Equations 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.10 The implications of the
9It is also conceivable that this child-specific characteristic is not a pure vertical shifter of
investment productivity, but instead represents horizontal differences between children. For exam-
ple, some children might respond better to investments related to reading, while others respond
better to investments related to numerical learning. When parents do not know their child’s type,
this represents an extra source of uncertainty. But when parents learn the type, they are able to
correctly tailor their investments and they decrease the uncertainty that they face.
10Note that Equation (2.3) suggests that variance increases linearly in investment levels. The
“toy” example of betting on a football game in the introduction would suggest that each unit
of investment is perfectly correlated, so variance would increase with y2. The assumption here
is equivalent to each unit of investment having an independent effect. Note that this does not
mean that there is no dynamic complementarity: higher early investments imply higher later
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illustrative model should not change as long as variance increases at least linearly in
investment levels. This generates utility costs of risk borne which are weakly convex
in investment.
E

 Y
S

 =
 y
s
 (2.2)
var

 Y
S

 =
 yσ2y 0
0 sσ2s
 (2.3)
Parents choose to invest an actual number of hours, (y, s), throughout childhood.
These are actual hours in the sense that they enter into the time budget constraint
of Equation (2.1). The larger the choice of time investment, the higher the mean
(and variance) of the distribution of realized human capital investments, Y and S.
That realized human capital investments don’t equal inputs in general captures the
fact that parents are uncertain about the exact effects of their investments. Parents
know that if they choose to spend more time with their children, this will, on average,
improve the children’s outcomes. That dE[Y ]/dy = 1 amounts to a normalization.
I assume that parents have complete knowledge of the way that realized human
capital investments Y and S translate into labor market outcomes H(Y, S). Though
this assumption seems strong, it also represents a normalization within my empirical
context. To take this illustrative model to data, I will look at how time investments
depend on uncertainty. It is possible that parents are uncertain about how their time
productivity of investments. The stochastic realization of early and late productivity are assumed
to be independent.
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investments translate into human capital, the form of the human capital production
function, or in the future value of human capital in the labor market. I choose to
put all uncertainty into how parents’ time builds children’s human capital, but this
is just an arbitrary division of uncertainty between uncertainty in the efficacy of
inputs and the production function for outputs. Other divisions would increase the
complexity of the situation without empirical content in this context.
The next necessary assumptions are on the form of H(Y, S). I assume that for
any level of time investment X:
∂H(X,X)
∂Y
>
∂H(X,X)
∂S
(2.4)
Equation (2.4) says that at the same level of human capital investment at each
point in childhood, the marginal unit of investment when children are young is
greater. This is the assumption that brings in the findings from a growing literature
on early childhood investments that investments in young children are productive
(see Almond and Currie (2011)).11 While it is not crucial to the points considered
here, this illustrative model can allow for the findings from Cunha and Heckman
(2008) and Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) that early and late investment
in children are complementary in the production of adult skills.
11Since H is concave in each argument, it shouldn’t in general be true that ∂H(Y, S)/∂Y >
∂H(Y, S)/∂S at any (Y, S). I assume that investment in early childhood is more productive by
saying that if investments over childhood were at equal levels, investment in early childhood would
be more productive.
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2.2.1 Equilibrium in the Illustrative Model
When parents optimize, the following first order conditions hold:
u′(c1) = δu
′(c2) (2.5a)
u′(c1) = δ
2EVy (2.5b)
Where EVx ≡
∂
∂x
(E [uc(H(Y, S))| y, s]) , x ∈ {y, s}
EVy = EVs (2.5c)
c1 + c2 = 2Hw − w(y + s) (2.5d)
The set of Equations 2.5 characterizes parents’ optimal choices. Equation (2.5a)
shows that parents smooth their consumption over time.
Equation (2.5b) describes how parents substitute between consumption and
investment in their child. Parents equate the marginal utility of consumption with
the marginal impact on expected utility of investing in children. The marginal
impact on expected utility of investment includes both the fact that investment raises
the average level of children’s human capital and that it increases the uncertainty
that parents face.
The tradeoff between investment in early and late childhood is represented by
Equation (2.5c). Because investing a unit in y is more risky than investing a unit
in s (since σ2y > σ
2
s), risk averse agents will in general choose an allocation of (y, s)
where the expected marginal productivity of H is higher with respect to y than with
respect to s. As agents become more tolerant of risk, they will choose allocations
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of (y, s) that are more productive, in the sense that they produce a given level of
expected human capital with lower time investment. That is, they will choose to
produce a given expected level of child outcomes H̄ with more investment when
young (y) and less when school-age (s).
The tradeoff between risk and return can be clarified by assuming that utility
is quadratic.12 While restrictive, this allows a clear focus on the tradeoff that parents
face between increasing their children’s human capital on average and the risk that
they bear. Under this assumption, parents only care about the mean and variance
of their children’s outcomes and expected utility simplifies to the sum of the same
quadratic utility function evaluated at the expected value of human capital and an
additively separable term that is decreasing in the variance of the random variable.
That is, expected utility can be written as in Equation 2.6:
E [uc[H(Y, S)]| y, s] = uc(E[H(Y, S)])−Bvar(H(Y, S)) (2.6)
Where uc(H) = A ·H −B ·H2
Here, more risk tolerant families face a relatively lower utility cost of bearing risk,
B, but have otherwise similar preferences for child services A.
Thus as parents become more risk tolerant, they will change their time in-
vestments along two dimensions. They will choose higher investment throughout
childhood (more of both y and s) through Equation 2.5b and they will substitute
12See e.g. Christiansen, Joensen, and Nielsen (2007) and Palacios-Huerta (2003), who use this
assumption to justify considering the mean and variance of human capital portfolio allocations. In
general, individuals’ decision in a problem like this depends on the third derivative of the objective
function (see Kimball (1990)).
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investment when young (y) for investment when school-age (s) through Equation
(2.5c).13
These two parental responses to differences in risk tolerance cannot be detected
directly in the data. We observe only investment decisions y and s for parents with
different levels of risk tolerance. But the two effects work in opposite directions in
late childhood. As more risk tolerant parents shift investment from late childhood
to early childhood, they decrease s, but as they increase investment throughout
childhood, they increase s. Thus the net effect on investment in late childhood is
ambiguous. The two effects that can be detected in the data are that more risk
tolerant parents unambiguously increase investment in early childhood (y is larger)
and that they tilt their investment profiles towards early childhood (y− s is larger).
In the empirical section of this chapter, I will check for these two empirical effects
on parental investment behavior.
2.3 Empirical Analysis of Uncertain Parental Investment
In this section, I take the predictions of Section 2.2 to the data using the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The PSID has measures of parental investment
over childhood and measures of parents’ risk tolerance. I use these measures to
test whether more risk tolerant parents reallocate time towards early childhood and
whether more risk tolerant parents spend more time at each point in childhood.
13The comparative statics in the quadratic case are described in Appendix A.1.
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2.3.1 Description of Measures of Risk Tolerance and Time Invest-
ment
2.3.1.1 Measures of Time Investment from the PSID Child Develop-
ment Supplement
I use the PSID Child Development Supplement (CDS) time diary data as a
measure of parental investment. Time diaries give detailed information on individ-
ual’s daily activities. The PSID CDS time diaries, in particular, focus on the time
use of children, which allows observation of how much time children spend with their
parents. These time diaries have been used elsewhere as direct measures of human
capital investment (Villena-Rodán and Ŕıos-Aguilar (2012)). They have also been
used in work which studies family processes and decisions (Folbre, Yoon, Finnoff,
and Fuligni (2005); Hofferth and Sandberg (2004).
The PSID is a nationally representative panel survey. It began in 1968 with
a sample of about 18,000 individuals in 5,000 families in 1968.14 Members of these
families and their descendants have been followed until the present day. Beginning
in 1997, the PSID selected a sample of children ranging from birth to age 12 from
existing PSID families to follow in the context of their development. This is known
as the Child Development Supplement and consists of interviews in 1997, 2002, and
2007 as well as “Transition to Adulthood” modules in 2007 and 2009. All eligible
children (those under age 12) were included in the sample, up to a maximum of 2
per family. In families with more than 2 children under 12, the two children were
14See http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Guide/Brochures/PSID.pdf
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sampled randomly.
As part of the CDS, each family recorded two 24 hour time diaries for each
child in the supplement. These time diaries included information on what activity
each child was doing at every point during the day as well as both “with whom” the
child did the activity and “who else was present” with the child at the time. Because
one weekday and one weekend day are recorded for each child, I can aggregate data
to a synthetic “week”.
Because of their richness, there are several classification decisions that go into
creating a measure of parental “investment”. To the extent possible, I try to follow
existing literature and show the results of different classification decisions. I aggre-
gate the activities that children were doing “with” their parents to a simulated week.
This is useful for the purposes of this chapter, since time when parents are actively
engaged with their children is likely the most relevant for human capital investment.
It is also close to what Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008) do, in that they focus on
time spent in “primary” activities, which is the parent’s activity that requires the
majority of their attention. Villena-Rodán and Rı́os-Aguilar (2012), who use the
same data, also focus on this measure of parental time investment. Since different
types of time might be differentially related to children’s human capital development,
risk tolerance might be related to different types of time in different ways. I therefore
also aggregate activities into categories as in Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008):
recreation, education, and basic care.15 Recreation includes time spent watching
15I ignore Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008)’s other major category, travel time, since it’s
relationship to children’s human capital development is more ambiguous. Time spent in transit
is unlikely to develop human capital directly. But especially in late childhood when children
participate in activities outside the home, travel is likely complementary to many investments.
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television, playing sports, attending meetings and events, socializing with friends,
doing arts and crafts, or playing games, among many other activities. Education
includes time spent together on homework, reading, or teaching children. Basic care
includes time spent attending to basic physical needs of children, including bathing,
feeding, and providing medical care. Of these types of time use, educational time is
conceptually the most related to children’s human capital. Recreational time is also
related to human capital development, since especially young children often learn
by playing games for example, rather than by reading or intensive study. I argue
that time in basic care is less related to the development of children’s future labor
market skills.16 Altogether, the time diaries provide a detailed look into the types
of time that parents spend with their children and are hence useful for measuring
investment.
Since I observe know whether one or both parents is participating “with” the
child, I have to make decisions about what level of involvement from each parent
constitutes investment. I follow Folbre, Yoon, Finnoff, and Fuligni (2005), who argue
that time spent with both parents consists of higher quality, lower stress interactions
than time with one parent and thus should be counted separately. Though my
results are robust to either considering only maternal time or counting the total
number of hours that either the mother or father was involved, for the majority of
The patterns for travel time are qualitatively similar to those for time in basic care, discussed
below.
16Though neglecting basic care of children could increase risk of serious illness, or death, groom-
ing and feeding children is less directly related to future labor market productivity than are the
decisions about spending time with them in educational activities. Therefore, time that parents
spend in basic care might also capture the propensity for children to be “at-risk” in the sense of a
large probability of something very bad happening.
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the work I use the definition of time investment as the sum of time that a child
spends in activities with his or her mother plus the time in activities with his or her
father.17 Thus I count as investment time in activities reported as “with” the parent,
since these represent more intensive, and likely beneficial, parental interactions. I
construct the measure of total parental investment as the total time that the mother
spent in primary activities with the child plus the total time that the father spent
in primary activities with the child.
In order to provide a clean test of the predictions from Section 2.2, I need
measures for individual children when they are “young” and when they are “school-
age”. I operationalize the definition of “young” as children who are under 5 years
old in 1997. These same children, when they are surveyed in 2002, are between 5
and 10 years old, the period I will call “school-age”. These time periods correspond
especially closely to the concept of “early” childhood in the literature.18 I restrict
my estimation sample to families where the CDS child lives with both biological
parents in both 1997 and 2002. I also restrict the sample to parents who were
also together in 1996, so that the risk tolerance measure discussed in Section 2.3.1.2
applies to the same family. These restrictions excludes more than half of the sample.
Thus my sample is of families where the CDS child lived with both parents at least
17Folbre, Yoon, Finnoff, and Fuligni (2005) also argue that a true measure of the parental cost
of raising children involves the supervisory time when parents are present but not actively engaged
with children. While this is no doubt true, I am interested primarily with parental investments
that increase the future human capital and skills of children. Time spent directly with children,
and particularly time spent in education and active recreational activities are the most likely to
lead to these types of skills. I do briefly use total time with parents present as another falsification
test, since having a parent present but not actively engaged likely represents less of an investment.
18Almond and Currie (2011) surveys Human Capital Development before Age 5, while Cunha,
Heckman, and Schennach (2010) estimate separate production parameters for children aged 0 to
5-6 and for children aged 5-6 and up.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for PSID CDS sample children
Mean St. Dev. S.E. Min Max
Both Parents, All Time in ’97 50.7 22.0 1.27 4.683 149.3
Both Parents, All Time in ’02 35.9 17.7 1.02 0 98.75
Mother, All Time in ’97 31.8 15.5 0.90 2.550 93.02
Mother, All Time in ’02 21.3 10.6 0.61 0 65
Both Parents, Recreational Time in ’97 18.8 14.4 0.83 0 77.42
Both Parents, Recreational Time in ’02 15.0 12.1 0.70 0 59.83
Both Parents, Basic Time in ’97 15.5 7.99 0.46 0 47.75
Both Parents, Basic Time in ’02 8.04 5.31 0.31 0 26.25
Both Parents, Educational Time in ’97 1.97 2.62 0.15 0 15.17
Both Parents, Educational Time in ’02 1.78 3.06 0.18 0 20
∆ Time, 1997− 2002 14.8 23.2 1.34 -77.67 106.2
∆ Educational Time, 1997− 2002 0.20 4.19 0.24 -20 15.17
∆ Recreational Time, 1997− 2002 3.81 15.7 0.91 -48.78 63.50
Age of Child in ’97 (Months) 34.5 18.1 1.05 2 65
Child is Non-White 0.088 0.28 0.016 0 1
Male 0.52 0.50 0.029 0 1
In School 0.45 0.50 0.029 0 1
Observations 298
Note: This table presents weighted summary statistics for children in the PSID-
CDS sample who were aged 5 or under as of the 1997 interview date. All time
variables are presented in units of hours per week. The sample is limited to
families where the same mother filled out time diaries in 1997 and 2002, the child
lived with both biological parents in both 1997 and 1992, and parental education
and fertility histories were available. Among these families, the sample is further
restricted to those where the couple also lived together in 1996 and one of the
members responded to the risk tolerance supplement that year.
until the second sample period in 2002, and the family was also together during
the 1996 PSID survey. I balance the “panel” of time diary data, so that I only
consider respondents in 1997 who also report time diaries in 2002. Though I don’t
restrict the sample to married parents, 100% of my sample, is in, fact married. My
sample selections on family stability will limit inference to families who more closely
resemble the prototypical “middle class” family.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics from the child’s perspective. Parents
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spent about 51 hours per week actively engaged with a child in 1997, and mothers
accounted for about 32 of the hours. Compared to the rest of the CDS time diaries,
this sample has relatively high paternal involvement due to the sample selection on
biological parents and marital stability. Of the total time that parents spent “with”
their children in the synthetic week in 1997, they spent on average about 20 hours in
recreational activities, 16 hours basic care, and 2 in educational activities including
homework help and parents reading to the child.19 Notice that parents spent more of
all types of time with their children in 1997, when they were an average of just under
3 years old than in 2002. This pattern is noted widely in the literature, including
in Price (2008), Bryant and Zick (1996), and Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008).
The decline in parental time with children is mostly related to time spent in basic
care. Time spent in other activities declines less rapidly.20
Table 2.2 shows summary statistics of families who have children in the PSID
CDS. There are about 300 children in my sample who come from about 240 families.
On average, the mothers are 32 and the fathers are 34. Because the families are
selected for stability, they are richer, more educated, and older than the population
as a whole.
19As a point of reference, if both parents spent every waking hour with a child, this would result
in 224 hours of parental time per week.
20These times are generally larger than those reported in Table 1 of Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney
(2008) and from estimates using the American Time Use Survey in general. This is mostly due to
the restrictive definition of time with children in the ATUS, which requires the child to be essential
for the activity. By comparison, in the PSID time is counted if the child was doing an activity
with the parent. If a parent and child went to a movie together, this would count as parental time
in the PSID but not in the ATUS. The parent could easily have gone to the movie without the
child so it would not count as parental in the ATUS. But the parent was doing the activity with
the child, so this would count as parental time in the PSID.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for PSID CDS sample families
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Age of Youngest Child (’97) 2.026 1.187 1 5
Biological Children in HH (’97) 1.968 1.157 1 11
Mother in LF (’97) 0.741 0.439 0 1
Total income / $100k (’97) 0.672 0.402 0.0431 2.605
Mom Col. Grad 0.396 0.490 0 1
Mom HS Grad 0.951 0.216 0 1
Non-White Mother 0.0924 0.290 0 1
Age of Mother (’97) 32.16 5.411 19 46
Age of Father (’97) 34.09 5.888 20 49
Risk Tolerance (KSS, Standardized) 0.0284 1.013 -1.075 2.925
Risk Tolerance (KSS) 0.532 0.240 0.270 1.220
Observations 244
Note: This table presents weighted summary statistics for PSID-CDS
sample families that are used throughout this chapter. The sample is
restricted to “stable” families where at least one child in the CDS aged
5 or under was living with both biological parents in 1997 and 2002. For
more detail on the sample see the notes to Table 2.1.
2.3.1.2 Measure of Risk Tolerance in the PSID
In 1996, the PSID asked a series of questions to estimate the risk preferences
of the survey respondent in households with employed heads.21 Participants were
asked questions of the following form:
Suppose you had a job that guaranteed you income for life equal to
your current, total income. And that job was (your/your family’s) only
source of income. Then you are given the opportunity to take a new, and
equally good, job with a 50-50 chance that it will double your income
and spending power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut your
income and spending power by a third. Would you take the new job?
21The survey respondent is whoever answered the survey in a particular year. This might or
might not be the “head of household” who is almost always male partner in a couple. In my
sample, the respondent was the male partner in 1996 in about 65% of the households.
55
In addition to asking about risking a third of income, the same question was asked
about fractions of 3/4, 1/2, 1/5, and 1/10, and each respondent was classified as
having an indifference point within a range given by their responses. Because this
question asks about gambles relative to an individual’s permanent household income,
the elicited measure is one of relative risk tolerance.
Knowing the range of gambles that an individual would accept and reject, and
making assumptions about the functional form of people’s utility functions and the
population distribution of the utility function parameters, it is possible to estimate
expected values of risk aversion and risk tolerance for each individual, conditional
on their responses. Values of personal “risk tolerance” were computed initially by
assuming a log-normal population distribution of the parameter θ in a CRRA utility
function over income x of the form in Equation 2.7 (Luoh and Stafford 1997).
u(x) =
x1−
1
θ
1− 1
θ
(2.7)
A very similar question had previously been fielded in the Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS) in 1992, and refielded to a subset of earlier respondents. This
feature of the HRS allows insight into the degree of measurement error and persis-
tence in the answers to this question. Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997)
and Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008) analyze the measurement error and find it
to be quite substantial. Sahm (2007) analyzes the persistence and determinants of
the risk tolerance measure in depth. She finds that the measurement error compo-
nent of risk tolerance is roughly twice as large as the persistent component. She
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also finds that the portion of the persistent error that is explainable by unobserved
individual characteristics is quite large. Unobserved differences that are consistent
for individuals over time explain about twice the variation as persistent differences
that are related to observables. Thus the measurement error component of risk tol-
erance is roughly four times as large as the component that is related to observable
characteristics. While Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008) show that even this quite
noisy measure of risk tolerance is related to investment behavior, by correcting for
measurement error they demonstrate a relationship that is substantially stronger.
Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009a) use the measured variance of measure-
ment error from the Health and Retirement Study to generate a measurement error
corrected measure in the PSID. I use this measure in the bulk of the empirical work
in Section . The tabulations of the distribution of the measurement error corrected
relative risk tolerance measure θ from Equation (2.7) in my sample and the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) that Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro studied
are presented in Table 2.3. The rows of Table 2.3 present information for groups of
respondents who answered the risk tolerance questions in the same way. The first
two columns represent the smallest share of income at risk that would be rejected
and the largest share of income accepted. That is, respondents counted in the third
row would reject a gamble risking half of their income or more, but accept losing
a third of their income or less. The third column presents the value of risk toler-
ance (θ) assigned to respondents in this group.22 The next three columns present
22To calculate the expected cardinal value of risk tolerance given responses, I follow Kimball,
Sahm, and Shapiro (2009b) in order to correct for measurement error and status quo bias.
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the fraction of the Health and Retirement Study, the PSID, and my sub-sample
of the PSID who answered the risk tolerance question in each way. Compared to
the HRS (column 4), the PSID sample is significantly more risk tolerant. Nearly
twice as many respondents would accept any gamble, and one third fewer reject all
gambles. This likely reflects the fact that the PSID sample of working-aged people
is significantly younger than the HRS sample of those over 50, combined with the
fact that risk tolerance decreases with age.23 Column 6 of Table 2.3 presents the
distribution of risk tolerance in my sample. Compared to the sample of all PSID
Risk Tolerance Supplement respondents in Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009a), my
sample of young, married parents has fairly similar risk tolerance. The mean and
standard deviation in my sample are 0.53 and 0.24, respectively.
My empirical strategy rests on the assumption that family’s risk preferences are
not meaningfully related to other unobservable family characteristics. I examine this
issue in my own sample in Section 2.3.2.1, but findings of other authors are important
as well. Two of the most important demographic differences in risk tolerance are that
the old are relatively more risk averse than the young and that women are relatively
more risk averse than men (see Sahm (2007) for a discussion). Neither of these
relationships is important in my context. In my illustrative modelling framework
in Equation 2.1, discussed in Section 2.2, there is only one value of risk tolerance
for the household. Whether the survey respondent who answered the question was
male or female, I use the response to proxy for the household’s overall level of risk
23See the discussion in Sahm (2007), Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009b), or Barsky, Juster,
Kimball, and Shapiro (1997).
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tolerance. If the distribution of men’s and women’s risk tolerance differ only in
means, I can control for this by controlling for the respondent’s gender.
In order to use the risk tolerance measure of one spouse to proxy for the
entire household, the spouse’s risk tolerance should be positively correlated with
the household’s overall effective level of risk tolerance. This will be the case as
long as assortative mating on risk tolerance is positive, so that more risk tolerant
individuals are in more risk tolerant households. There is empirical evidence for
positive assortative mating on risk tolerance. Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009b)
note that the correlation between husbands and wives in the HRS is 0.41.24 Dohmen,
Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2008) look at a different survey based measure of risk
tolerance in the German Socioeconomic Panel, where individuals rate themselves on
their willingness to take risk on an 11 point scale. Using this measure, controlling
for demographics, cohabiting and married couples have a correlation of 0.27.25 Risk
tolerance thus appears to be positively correlated within the household. To the
extent that a single spouse’s risk tolerance is an imperfect proxy for the household’s,
any relationship between risk tolerance and investment will be biased towards zero.
There are also systematic differences in risk tolerance over the life cycle. These
differences are relatively less important for my context. My sample contains only
children from birth through age 5 in 1997, so the parents in my sample have a very
compressed age distribution relative to the population as a whole. Therefore, differ-
24This correlation excludes husbands and wives who answered the question in the same sitting,
and who hence might be more likely to respond in a similar way.
25Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005) validate this survey instrument
by asking it to a representative sample of 450 Germans and measuring risk taking behavior through
lottery choices. They find that the two measures are strongly related.
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ences between families in risk tolerance reflect differences that are not attributable
to their location in the life course.
One important caveat in the argument that risk tolerance is unrelated to other
individual characteristics is that the measure of risk tolerance is a relative one. Recall
that the survey instrument does not ask about a gamble over absolute amounts of
money, but rather talks about a job that would affect household permanent income
proportionally. Thus the gamble is more risky in an absolute sense for households
with larger current income. Since θ in Equation (2.7) is fit to a CRRA utility
function, θ is implicitly related to observables to the extent that these observables
correlate with current income. Households with higher permanent incomes are asked
about proportionally larger income risks. That risk tolerance is uncorrelated with
income suggests that higher income households are more risk tolerant (in an absolute
sense) in proportion to their income. Other work has found similar relationships.
Sahm (2007) finds that income and wealth are unrelated to measured risk tolerance
in the HRS. Guiso and Paiella (2008) use a slightly different measure of risk tolerance
in Italy and find that even though relative risk aversion does not explain household
behavior, absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth.
2.3.2 Empirical Relationships
2.3.2.1 Risk Tolerance and Observable Characteristics
In Section 2.3.2.2, I show that risk tolerance is related to time use in my sam-
ple of intact families with children under 5 in 1997, conditional on a set of family
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level control variables. In order to interpret the coefficient on risk tolerance as re-
lated to parents’ underlying preferences and not other family level unobservables, I
need to assume that risk preferences are conditionally uncorrelated with any other
unobserved determinants of time use. This is an inherently untestable assumption.
However, it is possible to test the extent to which risk preferences are correlated
with observed family characteristics. If risk preferences are not correlated with
observables, they can only be correlated with unobservables which are themselves
uncorrelated with observable characteristics. Since I observe a wide range of socioe-
conomic indicators, I can show that risk preferences cannot be correlated with any
unobservables which are correlated with socioeconomic characteristics. Towards this
end, Table 2.4 presents the raw correlations between the normalized risk tolerance
measure on each control variable. Aside from the time use variables in the first few
rows, notice that most variables have relatively low correlations with risk tolerance
(generally below 0.1 in most cases).
Next, I show that the conditional correlations of θ with sets of covariates are
also small. Table 2.5 shows a series of regressions of the risk tolerance parameter θ on
various sets of controls. The row indicated by F and p indicates the F -statistics and
the p-values for tests of joint significance of the coefficients. The control variables
are a set of dummy variables for the number of children up to 4, a set of dummy
variables for the age of the youngest child, and demographic variables including
the mother’s race, the children’s sex, and the mother’s age and household income.
I use family size and the age of the youngest child because these are important
determinants of parental time with children (Price (2008)) and I also use them
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Table 2.4: Raw correlation coefficients between risk tol-
erance and family observable characteristics
Corr. Coeff. p
Male 1996 Respondent 0.105 0.103
All Time in ’97 0.0769 0.232
Recreational Time in ’97 0.0555 0.388
Basic Time in ’97 -0.0428 0.506
Educational Time in ’97 0.169 0.00818
Biological Children in HH (’97) 0.0199 0.757
Age of Youngest Child (’97) 0.0726 0.259
Non-White Mother -0.106 0.0987
Age of Mother (’97) 0.0340 0.597
Age of Father (’97) 0.0363 0.573
Mom HS Grad 0.0446 0.488
Mom Col. Grad -0.0366 0.569
Dad HS Grad 0.0595 0.354
Dad Col. Grad -0.0275 0.669
Mom Years of Schooling 0.0270 0.674
Dad Years of Schooling 0.0285 0.658
Total income / $100k (’97) 0.0377 0.558
Observations 244
Note: This table presents the raw correlation using
household level weights between the 1996 PSID risk tol-
erance supplement measure of risk tolerance (corrected
for status quo bias and measurement error as in Kimball,
Sahm, and Shapiro (2009a)) and other PSID household
variables. The reported p values indicate the statistical
significance of these correlations. These are the same
p values that would be calculated from running a re-
gression of the risk tolerance on each variable and a
constant. For a description of the sample selection, see
the notes to Table 2.1.
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Table 2.5: The explanatory power of demographics and family structure for
household risk tolerance in the PSID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age of Youngest X X X X
Family Size X X X X
Demographics X X X X
Father is Resp. X X X X X X X
R2 0.0270 0.0272 0.0260 0.0413 0.0426 0.0396 0.0550
Adj. R2 -0.00174 0.0109 0.00561 0.000328 -0.00259 0.00709 -0.00248
N 245 245 245 245 245 245 245
F 1.365 2.084 1.880 1.400 1.717 1.903 1.591
p 0.221 0.0835 0.0985 0.181 0.0705 0.0604 0.0826
k 7 4 5 10 11 8 14
Note: This table presents a series of regressions of the PSID risk tolerance measure on
the sets of controls indicated. All regressions contain a control for whether the husband
or wife was the respondent that answered the PSID risk tolerance question in 1996. Age
of Youngest is a set of dummy variables for the age, in years, of the youngest child in the
household. Family Size is a set of dummies indicating whether there are one, two, three,
or four or more children in the family. Demographics include controls for parent’s age,
race, family income, and mother’s schooling. Below the table, the F row presents the F
statistic of the joint test of significance of the set of variables contained in that regression.
The p value corresponds to the test of the joint equality of zero of all coefficients except
the constant. For more information on the sample selection, see the notes to Table 2.1.
later in Section 2.3.2.2. The coefficient on non-white families in Table 2.5 is the
closest to individual statistical significance, consistent with the results in Table 2.4.
Though models with the number of children in the household and the age of the
youngest child are jointly statistically significant at the 10% level, none of the sets
of coefficients in any combination are statistically significantly related to θ at the
5% level. Given that each of the variables is individually uncorrelated with risk
tolerance as seen in Table 2.4, this is not entirely surprising.
Finally, the illustrative model in Section 2.2 assumes that parents’ decision
to have children is exogenous and not a function of risk tolerance. The fertility
decision certainly affects the risks that parents bear, but the direction of this effect
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ambiguous. Having additional children requires parents to put more resources into
their children, which would tend to increase the risk that parents face. However,
distributing a fixed amount of resources among more children would tend to decrease
the risk that parents face to the extent that children’s outcomes do not perfectly
covary. The net implication of risk preference for parental fertility is an empirical
question. If parental risk preferences were a strong predictor of fertility decisions,
it would suggest the fertility decision should be in the model as well. I address this
point by using a sample of older PSID risk tolerance respondents who have completed
their fertility to examine the relationship between risk tolerance and fertility. I
consider the current fertility histories (as of 2009) for individuals who responded to
the risk tolerance question in 1996. The age of respondents is restricted to women
over 45 and men over 50, who can be reasonably expected to have completed their
fertility. Table 2.6 provides statistical evidence on this point. Since this sample
did not have to also have CDS children and complete multiple time diaries, the
sample size is much larger (nearly 1600 individuals). The first column presents the
estimated coefficients for a probit of a dummy variable for whether the individual
had any children on the risk tolerance measure. The marginal effect of this estimate
is about a 1.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of having any children in
response to a 1 standard deviation increase in risk tolerance, but the coefficient is not
statistically significant. The second column presents a linear probability model on
the same set of controls, which has a similar point estimate that is again statistically
insignificant.
The second set of columns in Table 2.6 present OLS regressions of the level
65
of completed fertility on risk tolerance. Column 3 suggests that risk tolerance does
not matter for completed fertility. Column 4 estimates the same model as column 3,
but the sample is now conditioned on parents having at least one child, in order to
see whether risk tolerance is related to having additional children. This is the most
relevant issue for my work on investments over childhood, since family structure is
related to time investments, changes in family structure will be related to differences
in time investments over time. The coefficient on risk tolerance in column 4 suggests
that this is not an issue. Note that the standard error is about 0.03, which suggests
that I can rule out effects above 0.07. By way of comparison, the propensity to
have an extra child after having two children of the same sex, as estimated from US
Census data by Angrist and Evans (1998), is also about 0.07. Thus it appears that
completed fertility is not related to individual risk tolerance.
Schmidt (2008) finds that while risk tolerance is unrelated to women’s com-
pleted fertility, it is related to the timing of births. She models the hazard of women’s
first birth as depending on risk preferences. Specifically, she finds that more risk
tolerant women have higher fertility hazards in their teenage years. Among unmar-
ried, college educated women, more risk tolerant women delay childbearing as they
reach the end of their fertile periods. Despite the effects of risk tolerance on the
timing of births, there is no net effect on completed fertility. Schmidt shows (in her
Table 9, where she estimates a model very much like column 2 of my Table 2.6) that
risk tolerance is unrelated to whether mothers eventually have a child.
Taken as a whole, the results in Table 2.4 to 2.6 present a potentially unex-
pected result. Family risk tolerance does not seem to be related to fertility or other
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Table 2.6: Regressions on the relationship between risk tolerance and
fertility in the PSID
Any Children Number of Children, OLS
Probit OLS Whole Sample Parents
Risk Tolerance (KSS) -0.0538 -0.0113 -0.0282 -0.00195
(0.0409) (0.00804) (0.0379) (0.0368)
Married 0.797*** 0.178*** 0.368** -0.0995
(0.123) (0.0260) (0.122) (0.126)
College Deg. -0.333*** -0.0724*** -0.264** -0.0996
(0.0909) (0.0180) (0.0851) (0.0837)
HS Deg. -0.522** -0.0654* -0.749*** -0.610***
(0.179) (0.0259) (0.122) (0.113)
Male -0.282* -0.0741** -0.106 0.113
(0.131) (0.0280) (0.132) (0.135)
Non-White 0.156 0.0337+ 0.325*** 0.276**
(0.103) (0.0190) (0.0894) (0.0859)
Constant 1.475*** 0.891*** 2.754*** 3.033***
(0.187) (0.0284) (0.134) (0.126)
Observations 1588 1588 1588 1396
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001
Note: These models present regressions of completed fertility from the PSID
Childbirth and Adoption History File on individual level controls. The first
column presents a probit on a binary indicator of the individual having
any live births. The reported coefficients are probit coefficients, and the
marginal effect of risk tolerance is −0.011. The second column estimates
the same model using a linear probability framework. Columns 3 and 4
present regressions on the total number of live births to an individual over
their lifetime on the same set of controls. Column 3 includes individuals
with no children, while column 4 restricts the sample to families that have
had at least one child.
Sample Selection: The sample for these regressions is women over 45 or men
over 50 as of the interview date in 2009, who answered the risk tolerance
supplement in the 1996 PSID and are likely to have completed their fertility.
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family level observables. At the same time, Table 2.4 shows that risk tolerance is
not uncorrelated with parental time use. It is worth noting that some other authors
have found measured relative risk tolerance to be related to some observable char-
acteristics, though the evidence is far from conclusive (for a survey, see Borghans,
Duckworth, Heckman, and ter Weel (2008)). Many authors find that risk tolerance
is positively related to education (Sahm (2007)), but Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and
Shapiro (1997) find education to be uncorrelated with risk tolerance, conditional on
race, religion, and gender and Dave and Saffer (2008) find risk tolerance to be con-
ditionally uncorrelated with education among those aged 21-54 in the PSID. Sahm
(2007), Dave and Saffer (2008), and Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997)
shows that risk tolerance is related to gender, but Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and
Rutström (2008) Holt and Laury (2002) find that risk tolerance is not correlated
with gender.
Many of the individual characteristics which the literature finds to be corre-
lated with risk preferences are not applicable to the current situation. I assume a
unitary household and use the respondent’s risk tolerance to proxy for that of the
household as a whole. Every household in the sample contains one male and one
female, and I assume that after controlling for level differences for the gender of the
respondent, The single household measure, combined with a control for the gender
of the respondent, accounts for differences in average risk tolerance.26 Risk tolerance
depends on the respondent’s age, but as shown in Table 2.2, no parents of young
26Schmidt (2008) shows that whether the husband or wife is the respondent is correlated with
some household level observables, and I do control for the gender of the respondent in the regres-
sions in Section 2.3.2.2.
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children in my sample were over age 50 in 1997 (and hence in 1996). Thus while risk
tolerance increases with age, parents in my sample are roughly similar in age and
age differences between them likely pick up other characteristics. My sample is also
entirely married, so to the extent risk tolerance is also correlated with marriage, my
results should be interpreted as the estimate for married families.
It is a relatively common finding in the literature that relative risk tolerance
is only weakly (if at all) correlated with income or wealth. The income relationship
that Dave and Saffer (2008) find is partly related to state effects, and might be
dependent on their context using the range of PSID respondents. Indeed, Guiso
and Paiella (2008) find that absolute risk aversion depends roughly proportionally on
income, suggesting that constant relative risk aversion preferences are uncorrelated
with income. Sahm (2007) also finds relative risk tolerance to be only very weakly
related to income and wealth. It is also important to note that the measure of
risk tolerance is in part reported net of socioeconomic status by its relative nature.
Higher socio-economic status families are likely to have higher family incomes, and
are thus asked about financial risks that are greater in magnitude.
2.3.2.2 Risk Tolerance and Parental Investment
In this section I show that parental investment behavior is related to risk
tolerance in ways that are consistent with the illustrative model of Section 2.2. The
illustrative model predicts that risk tolerant parents should spend more time with
their children in early childhood. This implication makes sense to test on parental
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time use data because in early childhood a large fraction of investments in children
come from parental time. The illustrative model of Section 2.2 also implies that more
risk tolerant parents should tilt their time investments towards early childhood and
away from late childhood.
In order to estimate how risk tolerance affects parental investments, I estimate
equations of the form in Equation 2.8.
Ii = βθi +Xiγ + εi (2.8)
In the equation, Ii represents one of 4 measurements of time investment by house-
hold i, θi represents household i’s risk tolerance, Xi represents a set of family level
controls, and εi is the error term.
I begin by estimating an equation like 2.8 using the time measure for 1997,
when all the children are between the ages of 0 and 5, and are therefore in what I call
“early childhood.” I expect that the estimated coefficient β will be positive, as more
risk tolerant parents invest more in early childhood. Table 2.7 presents the result of
estimating Equation (2.8) using several different parental time measures from early
childhood and several different sets of controls. The first set of controls contains
a set of clearly predetermined family and child demographic controls, including
the child’s age, sex, and race, as well as the age of each parent and the mother’s
education.27 In order to give a sense of the conditional correlations between the
27In tables that are not presented here, I also used the father’s education as a control. Due to
assortative mating, father’s and mother’s education are highly correlated, so I only present results
with mother’s education here.
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controls in column one and a set controls that are important for parental time use,
but may well be endogenous, I add additional controls in column two. This set of
controls also includes family income, whether the child is enrolled in any school, and
sets of dummies for the number of siblings (up to 3), and the age of the youngest
child in the family. Finally, the third column adds risk tolerance, my main variable
of interest, and an indicator for whether the father was the PSID respondent. In
addition to adding the coefficient of interest, comparing the second and third column
within each group allows the reader to see that including risk tolerance changes the
estimated coefficients on other control variables only slightly. To the extent that
including risk tolerance does not affect the coefficients on other determinants of
time use, the interpretation of the estimated risk tolerance coefficient as causal is
strengthened.
There are four groups of regressions in Table 2.7, one on each of total parental
time, educational time, recreational time, and basic care time. Overall time spent
“with” a child clearly contains some components which are investments and others
which are not. Time spent in educational activities most clearly represents parental
investments in their children’s future outcomes. Recreational time, especially to the
extent that activities like arts and crafts or sports help to build skills, also likely
represents parental investment to some extent. Time spent in basic care is the
least strongly related to human capital, so the relationship between risk tolerance
and time use should be least strong for this category. Each group of columns for
a particular type of time use contains the same sets of controls, in the same or-
der. Throughout the table, standard errors are reported in parentheses below the
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estimates.
I first investigate how the total parental time “with” children is related to
risk tolerance in the first three columns of Table 2.7. The first column presents a
regression of total parental time spent with children on the predetermined controls.
None of coefficients on these controls are statistically significant at conventional
levels. Non-white children receive about 7.5 fewer hours per week of overall parental
time, which though a substantial point estimate is very noisy. Though it is estimated
imprecisely, there is a large education gradient: children of mothers with a college
degree receive about 3.2 additional hours per week than children of mothers with
a high school diploma, and children in families with high school educated mothers
receive 3.5 additional hours per week compared to mothers with no high school
degree. This is consistent with the findings of Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008)
that more educated parents spend more time with their children. The second column
adds family income, a control for whether the child is enrolled in any school (or pre-
school), and sets of dummies for the number of siblings (up to 3), and the age of the
youngest child in the family. These variables do have significant explanatory power,
which can be seen asR2 increases from 0.05 to 0.12.28 This is not surprising, since the
age of the youngest child and the total number of siblings in the household are large
drivers of parental time use, as in Price (2008). Furthermore, children who attend
pre-school receive about 12 fewer hours per week of parental time. This is a large
and mechanical effect: if children are in pre-school, they are away from their parents.
28While the increase in R2 only shows that the variables have explanatory power jointly, in fact
the dummies for family size and the age of the youngest sibling have explanatory power individually
as well.
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Though imprecisely estimated, the point estimate on family income suggests that
parents with an additional $100,000 in income spend about 40 additional minutes
per week with their children.
The third column adds the standardized risk tolerance measure and the dummy
variable for whether the father was the respondent to the risk tolerance question.29
The coefficient on risk tolerance in column 3 is 1.86, indicating that a standard
deviation increase in family risk tolerance is associated with an extra 1.75 hours
per week of total parental time with children, but this coefficient is not statistically
significant. Importantly, adding risk tolerance in column 3 does not change the
estimated coefficients on other variables compared to column 2. A Hausman test
of the relevance of the risk tolerance measure for the estimation of the coefficients
in column 2 is unable to reject the hypothesis that the coeficients are unchanged
from column 2 to column 3. That the inclusion of risk tolerance does not affect the
other coefficients is consistent with the measure of risk tolerance picking up true risk
tolerance and not unobserved factors that are correlated with both risk tolerance and
time use. Given that risk tolerance is essentially uncorrelated with the observables,
as shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, this is not surprising. An alternative to column
3, presented in Appendix Table B1, contains only the predetermined controls from
column 1; the results are very similar.
Column 4 through column 6 repeat the analysis in columns 1 through 3 using
educational time, which is a clear representation of parental time investments in
29Risk tolerance is slightly correlated with the gender of the respondent (since men are more risk
tolerant than women) and the gender of the respondent is correlated with family socioeconomic
status. See the discussion in Section 2.3.1.2 and in Schmidt (2008).
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children’s skills. If risk tolerant parents are in fact investing more in their children
in early childhood, more educational time is very likely a part of this. Compared
to the first three columns, there is now enough statistical power to begin to see the
relationship between parental educational time and the covariates. The relationship
between educational time and the age of the child is increasing and concave, which
largely reflects the fact that little time is spent in educational activities with children
under one to two years of age. In column 4, the coefficient on whether the mother
has at least a high school education is 0.8, which is large relative to the mean of 2
hours per week.
Column 6 of Table 2.7 adds family risk tolerance. The estimated risk tolerance
coefficient on educational time is 0.56, and statistically significant at the 1% level.
This coefficient indicates that a standard deviation increase in family risk tolerance
increases parents’ educational time with their children by 0.56 hours per week during
early childhood. This is a large effect: the 95% confidence interval is between 7
and 50% of the sample average of 2 hours per week in educational activities. The
illustrative model from Section 2.2 implies that more risk tolerant families should
increase investment in early childhood, and in the case of educational time, the
clearest measure of time investment in the data, this does appear to be happening.
Once again, adding family risk tolerance again does not change the coefficients on
demographics.
In addition to educational time, recreational time that parents spend with their
children is likely to be effective in developing children’s skills. It is likely that even
if these activities are less formally related to skill development, young children still
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gain at least some important skills from them. Columns 7 through 9 examine the
determinants of time in recreational activities. The point estimate on the coefficient
of risk tolerance for recreational time use indicates that a one standard deviation
more risk tolerant family will spend 0.7 extra hours per week in recreational time,
but this is imprecisely estimated.
Columns 10 through 12 of Table 2.7 form a sort of falsification test by using
parental time in basic care as an outcome. Time spent in basic care, as discussed
previously, is less likely to be related to children’s future labor market skills, and
thus should present less of a risk to parents. If more risk tolerant parents also
spend longer in basic care, this might suggest that the risk tolerance measure is
picking up other family level unobservables that are related to time with children in
general. When risk tolerance is introduced in column 12, it is clear that more risk
tolerant parents do not spend more time in basic care for their young children. A
one standard deviation increase in risk tolerance is associated with about 0.3 fewer
hours per week in basic care. This estimate is half the size of that in column 6,
and is only 2% of the mean level of basic care time. This is consistent with risk
tolerance being uncorrelated with other family characteristics but related to parents’
propensity to invest in their children’s risky human capital.
The time that parents spend on basic care is related very strongly to age.
By age 5, columns 10 and 11 suggest that children receive about 10 fewer hours
per week of basic care than at birth. This is unsurprising, as the amount of time
required to feed, clothe, and care for children moderates dramatically over the first
few years of life. Parents of non-white children also spend about 4 fewer hours
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per week in basic child care than parents of white children. While adding income,
school enrollment, and family structure in column 10 increases the R2 substantially
for other types of time use, these variables have little additional explanatory power
for basic care. This is consistent with the idea that while attending to children’s
most basic physical needs is important, the marginal benefit diminishes relatively
quickly once the basic needs are met.
Altogether, Table 2.7 provides evidence that is consistent with parents treating
their time with children as an investment in a risky asset, as described in Section
2.2. The point estimates suggest that more risk tolerant parents spend an additional
0.56 hours per week in educational activities with their children. This coefficient
is 25% of the sample mean, and is very statistically significant. More risk tolerant
parents also appear to spend more time overall and in recreational activities with
their children in early childhood, but these effects are not statistically significant.
More risk tolerant parents do not spend more time during early childhood with
their children in basic care. Thus in addition to estimating a large and statistically
significant impact of parental risk tolerance on educational time use, I also show
that risk tolerance is more clearly related to parental time use within categories
that more closely represent investment in children’s human capital.
I next turn my attention to parental time as measured in 2002. At this point,
the children in the sample are now between ages 5 and 10. The theory of Section
2.2 does not have a strong prediction for how time in late childhood should depend
on risk tolerance. More risk tolerant parents prefer higher overall investment levels
in their children’s human capital throughout childhood, which suggests that more
77
risk tolerant parents would invest more time in their children in both early and
late childhood. At the same time, if early childhood represents a riskier but more
productive investment, more risk tolerant parents will tilt their time investments
away from late childhood and towards early childhood, potentially resulting in less
time spent in late childhood. The relative strength of each of these effects is an
empirical question, which I explore in Table 2.8.
The first three columns of Table 2.8 regress total parental time in 2002 on a
similar set of controls to the analogous columns in Table 2.7.30 As can be seen from
comparing columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.8, including risk tolerance again does not ap-
pear to change the coefficients on other demographic variables significantly, and this
is again borne out by a Hausman test. The risk tolerance coefficient suggests that
more risk tolerant families spend 2.0 fewer hours per week with their children overall.
This coefficient is statistically significant at only the 10% level. This is consistent
with parents’ substitution of time investments towards early childhood outweighing
the desire for more investment throughout childhood, resulting in decreases in time
spent in late childhood.
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 2.8 again use time spent in education as a
dependent variable. Income and family structure are also important determinants
of late childhood educational time – the R2 increases from 0.03 in column 4 to 0.13 in
column 5. Adding in risk tolerance from column 5 to column 6 does not change the
other coefficients, and the estimated coefficient is essentially zero (0.038). That this
coefficient is essentially zero suggests that while more risk tolerant parents might
30I use the number of siblings and the age of the youngest child from 2002.
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both invest more in their children’s education time and tilt their time investment
profile towards early childhood, the net effect on educational investment time in late
childhood is zero.
Columns 7 through 9 of Table 2.8 present the analysis for recreational time
in 2002. Male children receive about 3 additional hours per week of parental time,
which is statistically significant and consistent with. This is consistent with the find-
ings of Lundberg, Pabilonia, and Ward-Batts (2006), who find that parents spend
more recreational time with sons. Families where the mother has graduated high
school spent over 5 additional hours per week in recreational activities with their
children relative to other parents. Adding risk tolerance into column 9, one standard
deviation more risk tolerant parents spend about 1.1 fewer hours per week in recre-
ational time with their older children. Though this effect is not precisely estimated,
this point estimate is consistent with more risk tolerant parents substituting their
investments towards early childhood.
Columns 10 through 12 of Table 2.8 again use time spent in basic care as a
form of falsification test. The change in the age coefficients from column 10 to 11
again suggests that having a younger sibling is an important factor in the degree of
time in basic care that children receive. The risk tolerance coefficient in Column 12
indicates that more risk tolerant parents spend essentially the same amount of time
in basic care as more risk averse parents. Again the point estimate is close to zero
and effects larger than 10% off of the mean in either direction can be ruled out.
Next, I turn attention to perhaps the most effective test of the theory in Section
2.2, which comes from looking at how the slope of the time investment profile varies
80
with risk tolerance. To do this, I take the difference between time investments
in 1997 and 2002. More risk tolerant parents have two motivations for changing
their investments that will affect the difference between their time investments in
early and late childhood. First, they would prefer to invest more in their children
throughout childhood. Without uncertainty, increasing investment will require pro-
portional increases across childhood.31 Thus as parents invest more throughout
childhood, the absolute difference between time when young and when school-age
will increase. Second, more risk tolerant parents prefer to tilt their time investment
profiles. That is, they prefer to shift their investment from relatively certain but
relatively unproductive time in late childhood towards relatively risky but relatively
more productive time in early childhood. Both of these motives suggest that more
risk tolerant parents should have positive coefficients in regressions of the difference
between time in early and late childhood on risk tolerance. These coefficients are
estimated in Table 2.9.
Because Table 2.9 exploits the panel nature of the PSID CDS time diary data,
by using as the dependent variable the time in 1997 minus time in 2002 by a family
with a particular child, I difference out any family or child fixed characteristics
which affect time use equally throughout childhood. Therefore, this specification
has an added advantage over the cross-sectional results which can only control for
observable differences across families and children.
Columns 1 through 3 of Table 2.9 present regressions on the difference in overall
31This is because the child production function is homogeneous of degree one or constant returns
to scale.
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parental time between 1997 and 2002. Children with college graduate mothers
receive investment profiles that are 6.5 hours per week steeper than their peers with
high school graduate mothers. In column 2, this difference drops slightly to 5.0
hours and becomes statistically insignificant. The average slope of the investment
profile in the sample is 14.8 hours per week, which suggests that the average child
in this sample received nearly 15 more hours of parental time in 1997 than in 2002.
The coefficient on school enrollment in column 2 is large and negative (−5.9), which
is as expected. Parents whose children were enrolled in school in early childhood
spent less time with them in 1997, while by ages 5-10 all children are enrolled in
school. This coefficient is smaller than the 12.0 fewer hours per week that children
of parents in daycare spent with them in 1997 (Table 2.7), suggesting that these
parents spent less time with their children in 2002 as well.
Column 3 of Table 2.8 adds the risk tolerance measure. Again, adding the risk
tolerance measure does not markedly change the coefficients on the other controls
between columns 2 and 3. Parents who are one standard deviation more risk tolerant
spend about 3.8 more hours with their children in early childhood compared to late
childhood. This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level, and suggests that
more risk tolerant parents are investing relatively more heavily in early childhood
than in late childhood, in order to take advantage of the high productivity of early
childhood investments. This is investment profile is tilted 25% more steeply than
the average of 14.8 hours per week. By comparison, the difference between families
with college and high school graduate mothers is 5.5 hours per week in column 3.
The difference between the investments of two families who differ in risk tolerance
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by about a one and a half standard deviations is the same as the estimated difference
between families where the mother has a college diploma compared to a high school
diploma.
Columns 4 through 6 present a similar analysis for the difference in educational
time between 1997 and 2002. In column 5, the estiamted coefficient on father’s age,
at −0.2, is statistically significant, but it is opposite in sign of the estimated coeffi-
cient on mother’s age and marriage is highly assortative on age, so this coefficient
is hard to interpret. Column 6 adds risk tolerance to the regressions of time dif-
ferences between 1997 and 2002. More risk tolerant families spend 0.5 additional
hours per week with their children in early childhood compared to late childhood.
This coefficient is marginally statistically significant at the 10% level. The average
difference between educational time in early and late childhood in Table 2.1 is only
0.2 hours, though, so a one standard deviation increase in risk tolerance more than
doubles the slope of the age-investment profile, or the amount that parents tilt their
time investments towards early childhood. The positive coefficient on risk tolerance
in column 6 of Table 2.9 is consistent with the theory that more risk tolerant par-
ents should have steeper age investment profiles in order to take greater advantage
of productive investments in younger children. The results imply that children of
parents who are one standard deviation more risk tolerant will start kindergarten
(reach age 6) with about 165 additional hours of time with their parents in educa-
tional activities.32 By comparison, we know that parental education is an important
32This suggests that examining the relationship between risk tolerance and child test scores
would be a fruitful avenue of research to pursue.
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determinant of children’s future human capital and children with college educated
mothers will start kindergarten with about 125 more hours of (between 30 and 220
hours with 95% confidence) educational time children of high school educated moth-
ers. This is not to suggest that risk tolerance necessarily is equally important as
parental education for other types of parental investments, or eventual human cap-
ital endowments, as parental education. But risk tolerance is clearly an important
determinant of parental time investment patterns over childhood, and its importance
for time investment is comparable in magnitude to parental education.
Columns 7 through 9 of Table 2.9 present the results for recreational time.
As mentioned previously, recreational time also likely develops human capital but
is perhaps a less intensive investment than educational time. Families with college
educated mothers have more steeply tilted time investment profiles in recreational
time than families with high school educated mothers, by about 5 hours per week.
The average child has a slope of the investment profile of only 3.8 hours per week.
Introducing risk tolerance in column 9 once again changes the coefficients on other
variables relatively little, but has a large and statistically significant effect on the
difference in recreational time between early and late childhood. A family that is a
single standard deviation more risk tolerant will spend 2.1 more hours in recreational
activities in early childhood than in late childhood. This is more than half of the
mean slope. A two standard deviation difference in risk tolerance has the same
effect on the slope of recreational investments as the difference between families
with college and high school educated mothers. However, the same caveat as above,
that this does not suggest that risk tolerance and parental education are equally
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important either for overall investment or for children’s human capital, still applies.
Again, to the extent that recreational time is one measure of parental investment in
children’s human capital, this provides evidence in favor of the theoretical prediction
that more risk tolerant families have more steeply tilted time investment profiles and
thus invest more heavily in early childhood.
A falsification test is once again provided by columns 10 through 12 of Table
2.9 using time in basic care. If time spent in basic care is relatively unimportant
for the uncertain human capital that parents invest in, then there is no reason for
the age-investment profile in basic care to slope downward more steeply with risk
tolerance. Indeed, this appears to be the case, as the coefficient in column 12 is very
small and not statistically significant.
The results in Tables 2.7 through 2.9 are very consistent with the theoreti-
cal prediction from Section 2.2 that more risk tolerant parents will tilt their time
investment profiles more steeply towards early childhood. There is evidence that
parents invest more in early childhood. While the point estimates on total (1.9) and
recreational time (0.7) use are positive but not statistically significant, the estimated
coefficient on educational time (0.56) is positive, large compared to the mean sample
average, and statistically significant. More risk tolerant parents choose more steeply
tilted time investment profiles by substituting their time towards early childhood
by 3.8 hours per week overall, 0.5 in educational time, and 2.1 in recreational time.
By contrast, they do not tilt their time investment profiles in basic care time, which
is less related to children’s future skill development.33
33Appendix Tables B1, B2, and B3 present parallel specifications to those in Tables 2.7, 2.8,
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It is worth a brief discussion of other potential explanations that the empirical
patterns in these few tables have ruled out. First, consider a simple model of parental
investment with only a single period of childhood. The relationships between time
use and risk tolerance are very different across childhood. Indeed, Table 2.9 can be
considered a test of whether the estimated coefficients on each control variable in
1997 and 2002 are the same. The coefficients for risk tolerance are not. Another
explanation that is rejected by the data is that risk tolerance is picking up a latent
measure of socioeconomic status. In Table 2.4, it is clear that risk tolerance is not
related to observable socioeconomic indicators, so for risk tolerance to pick up latent
socioeconomic status, it would have to be related to the portion of an unobserved
factor that is also uncorrelated with income, race, age, and education. Tables 2.7
through 2.9 provide additional indirect evidence of this. Adding risk tolerance in
the third of each group of columns has a small effect on the other coefficients. This
suggests that risk tolerance is not correlated with the same unobserved predictors of
time investment which are correlated with the other control variables. Many other
likely determinants of parental investents would be correlated with these family level
characteristics.
It is harder to test the prediction from the theory that more risk tolerant par-
ents invest more in their children overall. The patterns that emerge in the preceding
regressions suggest that more risk tolerant parents tilt their time investment profile
and 2.9, but present a different set of controls along with risk tolerance. These tables repeat the
first column in each set. The second column in each set of specifications in Appendix A.2 adds
risk tolerance but contains only the predetermined controls, omitting factors that might be jointly
determined with parental time investment. Though these tables are not discussed in depth in the
text, the point estimates for risk tolerance are relatively similar to the third column.
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toward early childhood but do not necessarily spend more time altogether with their
children throughout childhood (with the exception of educational time). However,
as suggested by the theory, on the margin, shifting an hour of time from late child-
hood to early childhood will have a net positive effect on expected children’s human
capital. Thus parents who spend the same total number of hours over childhood,
but who spend more of the time in early childhood will realize greater levels of chil-
dren’s human capital. By the same argument, even if parents substitute slightly less
than one hour toward early childhood and away from one hour in late childhood,
they could still be increasing the expected level of children’s human capital. To
know more about whether more risk tolerant parents choose higher overall levels of
investment, we need to know more about the technology of child development.
For realistic values of the marginal productivity of investment in early and late
childhood, it is likely that more risk tolerant parents are investing in higher levels
of human capital. There is considerable evidence that early childhood interventions
are more effective at building skills and remedying gaps than late childhood inter-
ventions. This suggests that, given current investment levels, the marginal benefit of
an extra unit of investment is larger in early than in late childhood. If risk tolerant
parents appear to spend roughly the same total number of hours over childhood, as
suggested by the roughly equal but opposite coefficients on risk tolerance in column
3 of Tables 2.7 and 2.8, they are investing more heavily in their children overall.34
34This is of course only a rough comparison. Investment can take many forms. It could be
that the marginal productivity of investment from parental time in early childhood is relatively
lower than the productivity of the basket of investments represented by early childhood education
programs.
88
2.3.2.3 The Robustness of Risk Tolerance and Time Use Measures
The analysis to this point has used a particular mapping between responses
to the risk tolerance question and expected risk tolerance bins. This measure was
based on correcting for measurement error and status quo bias as they exist in the
Health and Retirement Study (Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008)). These authors
find that in the context of how risk tolerance predicts the share of portfolio that
households hold in stocks in the HRS, correcting for individual level measurement
error increased the strength of the relationship between the cardinal risk tolerance
measure and portfolio allocations. Since the PSID only has a single measurement of
risk tolerance per household, Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009a) take the measured
magnitudes of measurement error and status quo bias from the HRS and use these
parameters in the maximum likelihood estimation for risk tolerance in the PSID. It
is this maximum-likelihood measure that I use in Sections 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.2.2.
I relax the assumptions on the form of the utility function, measurement error,
and status quo bias in Table 2.10 by using alternative measures of risk tolerance.
I present the coefficients on risk tolerance measures from regressions like those in
Columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 of Tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9. Each set of three columns
presents the risk tolerance coefficient from regressions of a given type of parental
time in 1997, in 2002, and the difference between 1997 and 2002 on the measure
of risk tolerance indicated by the row. Note that for each of the first three rows, I
take each risk tolerance measure and standardize it to have mean zero and standard
deviation 1. Therefore, the coefficients in each of the first three rows of Table 2.10
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can be compared directly as the effect of a one standard deviation increase in family
risk tolerance on parental time. The first row is the measure of risk tolerance from
Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009b), which is the preferred specification and was
used earlier in Section 2.3.2.2. The coefficients on total parental time, in 1997, 2002,
and the difference between them, were 1.9, −2.0, and 3.8, respectively. The second
row presents a mapping of responses to risk tolerance which does not account for
measurement error, which Luoh and Stafford (1997) estimate by simply assuming
that risk tolerance is log-normally distributed, fitting the mean and variance of
the distribution, and then assigning each bin to its expected value using the fitted
distribution and given that the response is in that bin. Thus the measure in the
second row does not correct for measurement error at all. Using the uncorrected
risk tolerance measure, the effect on total time is somewhat attenuated, dropping
from 1.9 hours to 0.9 hours in 1997, and from −2.0 hours to −1.4 hours in 2002.
There is now a reallocation of 2.2 hours towards early childhood, down from 3.8
hours using the error corrected measure. This suggests that, consistent with the
literature on the use of the risk tolerance measure, measurement error is important.
The effects on educational and recreational time are also attenuated somewhat, and
there is still no effect of risk tolerance on time with children in basic care.
The third row of Table 2.10 uses a näıve error correction method where the
bins are centered based on the error correction in the Health and Retirement Study
done by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997). Instead of using the estimated
magnitude of measurement error from the HRS to fit a maximum likelihood model
in the PSID, these estimates simply use the mapping from survey responses to
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cardinal risk tolerance directly from the HRS. Because this method will correct
for at least some of the measurement error, I would expect these coefficients to
be attenuated only slightly from those in the first row of Table 2.10. Using this
error correction method, the results are in fact slightly larger and more statistically
significant for total parental time (2.1, −2.3, and 4.3 instead of 1.9, −2.0, and 3.8 in
1997, 2002, and the difference, respectively) and recreational time (0.8, −1.5, and
2.3 instead of 0.7, −1.2, and 2.1 for each of the three time measures). The results
are slightly less strong for educational time (0.5, 0.1, and 0.4 instead of 0.6, 0.0, and
0.5, respectively). In none of the first three rows is basic care time related to risk
tolerance. It is encouraging that even though shifting the placement of response
bins matters modestly for the magnitudes of the estimates, the signs and overall
patterns don’t change. That rows 1 and 3, which use corrections for measurement
error, have larger point estimates than the second row suggests that measurement
error in risk preferences is again important.
The next several rows of Table 2.10 further relax distributional assumption
on the risk tolerance parameter. These rows present binary risk tolerance measures
that are equal to one if the respondent would accept a gamble with a 50% chance
of doubling or losing the presented fraction of future income. The rows proceed in
order from defining as risk tolerant anyone who would accept the risk of potentially
losing 1/10 of income to anyone who would accept a risk of losing 3/4 of their in-
come. Because these measures of risk tolerance are binary, the regression coefficients
in these cases have the interpretation of the difference in parental time allocation
between the “risk averse” and the “risk tolerant” group. Thus, the magnitudes of
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Table 2.11: Parental time with children by intensity
and risk tolerance
1997 2002 1997 - 2002
Primary 1.810 -2.057+ 3.765*
(1.517) (1.102) (1.542)
Secondary -3.135* -0.723 -2.136
(1.264) (1.145) (1.468)
Primary + Secondary -1.326 -2.780 1.629
(2.043) (1.713) (2.284)
N 298 298 298
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The first row of this table presents regressions
of the time that PSID CDS children spend in activities
where either the mother or father are listed as individ-
uals “with whom” the child does the activity. This is
the same measure of time use used in Tables 2.7, 2.8,
and 2.9. The second row of the table aggregates time
that children spend with parents when they are not
“with whom” the child was doing an activity but are
the answer to the question “who else was there”. The
third row of the table takes a simple sum of these two
measures. For a discussion of the sample selection, see
the footnote to Table 2.1. The controls are the same
as those reported in Tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9. The first
column of the table uses 1997 time use as the outcome
variable, the second column uses 2002 time use data,
and the third uses the difference between 1997 and 2002
time use.
these coefficients are not directly comparable to those in the first three rows. More
risk tolerant parents still spend more time with their children early in childhood and
less later in childhood, and the most statistically significant result is on the time
reallocation coefficient. Though there are differences in coefficients as the “risk tol-
erant” cutoff becomes more stringent, the general patterns are fairly robust across
a range of definitions of risk tolerance.
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Another useful check that the effect of parental risk tolerance is due to in-
vestment behavior, rather than other unobserved differences between families, is
presented in Table 2.11. This table takes advantage of the question on the CDS
time diaries which, in addition to asking “with whom” the child did an activity, also
asks “who else was there”. This allows the measurement of parents’ time spent gen-
erally supervising but not actively engaged with their children. While time spent as
“someone else who was there” is an important parental responsibility, it is unlikely
to lead to the same sort of human capital accumulation as time spent actively en-
gaged with children. The first row of Table 2.11 presents the by now familiar main
regression for total time that children spent in a primary activity with their par-
ents.35 The second row presents the regression using the total amount of time that
either parent was listed as also present. One standard deviation more risk tolerant
parents spend 3.1 fewer hours per week “around” their children in 1997, 0.7 fewer
hours per week around them in 2002, and altogether have secondary time investment
profiles that are 2.1 hours per week less steep. Interestingly, the second row suggests
that more risk tolerant parents spend less time around but not engaged with their
children in early childhood. Indeed, parents appear to shift their supervisory time
towards later childhood.
The third row presents the regression on the sum of the two measures of time
investment. The estimated coefficients on risk tolerance in these regressions using
the sum of primary and secondary time as a dependent variable are −1.3 in 1997,
35This table does not present breakdowns by activity because the connection between what
children are doing when parents are around but not actively involved and parental investment is
less clear. It is true that it might increase a child’s human capital to spend time on homework by
herself, but it is less obvious how to think about this decision reflects parental investment.
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−2.7 in 2002, and 1.6 on the difference, though these are all imprecisely estimated.
This pattern, where risk tolerance is not strongly related to the overall time spent
either actively or passively with children, is consistent with the analysis of Guryan,
Hurst, and Kearney (2008). Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney briefly analyze a measure
in the ATUS of time that parents spend counting their children as “with whom”
an event took place. They show that while there is a strong education gradient in
the amount of time that parents spend in primary child care activities with their
children, the gradient goes away when including the “with whom” time as well.
This suggests that the total number of hours that parents spend “around” their
children is a fairly fixed quantity. But parents who want to invest more in human
capital spend less of this time passively supervising their children and more time
doing activities with them. That total time with children around is relatively fixed
is consistent with the observed pattern that more educated families both spend more
time in child care and more time in the labor force.36
2.4 Conclusion
When parents make the decision to invest in their children, they must face
uncertainty as to the effects of their actions. I show that PSID risk tolerance sup-
plement measure of risk preferences matter for PSID CDS time diary measures of
36At first glance, the implication that parents have a fixed pool of time with their children
“around” which they allocate between active and passive child care seems at odds with my illus-
trative modeling framework in Section 2.2 where parents allocate their time between child care
and market work, whose outputs can be borrowed and saved. But if time that parents spend in
passive child care is also time spent in home production, the illustrative modeling framework is
appropriate.
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parental time investments. More risk tolerant parents appear to spend more time
with their children in early childhood and less in late childhood than their more
risk averse peers. I explain this apparent substitution of investments over childhood
using an illustrative model of parental investment in children’s human capital under
uncertainty. While early childhood investments are more productive, they are also
more risky. Investments in late childhood are less risky but also less productive. I
show that more risk tolerant parents will, when compared to their less risk tolerant
peers, both invest more throughout childhood and tilt their time investment profiles
towards early childhood.
I test the implications of this illustrative model using the PSID CDS and Risk
Tolerance Supplements. The rich time diary data in the CDS allow me to isolate
portions of parental time use that are related to children’s human capital, such as
recreational and educational time, as well as portions of time that are less likely
to represent investment in children’s futures. I find that one standard deviation
more risk tolerant parents invest 25% more time (0.6 hours per week) in educational
activities during early childhood. I also find that one standard deviation more risk
tolerant parents tilt their time investment profiles of total, recreational, and educa-
tional time towards early childhood by 3.8, 0.6, and 2.1 hours per week, respectively.
These reallocations make children of risk tolerant parents receive investments that
are slanted towards early childhood by 25%, 250%, and 50% more the respective
sample averages. While imprecisely estimated, these effects are statistically different
from zero. The effects seem proportionately stronger in parental activities that are
more consistent with investments which will affect children’s future human capital,
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though again the estimates are noisy. These patterns are consistent with risk toler-
ant parents reacting to the uncertainty that preparing young children for the future
represents. More risk tolerant parents do not tilt their time investment profiles in
basic childcare time, time which is less likely to represent investment in children’s
uncertain futures. Because risk tolerance is virtually uncorrelated with other family
level variables, these differences appear to be related to actual underlying parental
risk tolerance and not the result of correlations between risk tolerance measures and
other unobserved differences.
There are gaps in achievement between children that open up early in child-
hood (Cunha and Heckman (2007)). These gaps are persistent, relatively large, and
not fully understood. Yet as of eighth grade, test score gaps can explain a substan-
tial portion of the wage differential (Neal and Johnson (1996)). While these gaps
may be in part related to genetic factors, they are also likely related to differences
in investing behavior between parents. Risk tolerance is largely uncorrelated with
other parental characteristics, yet is strongly related to investment patterns. The
strong effects of risk tolerance on the level of early childhood time investment in
education time in particular suggest that risk and uncertainty might play a signifi-
cant role in explaining some of the gaps in abilities and skills between children that
open up in early childhood. This suggests that risk tolerance could explain some
differences in child achievement.
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Chapter 3
Asymmetric Information and Worker Productivity
3.1 Introduction
The information that employers have about employees in the labor market
could be of first order importance for wage determination. But the information sets
of employers and workers are very hard to measure accurately. Gibbons and Katz
(1991) measure the importance of one particular role for information in the labor
market: the negative signal associated with a worker being laid off. Gibbons and
Katz measure this signal (which they call the “lemons effect”) by comparing the
wage change of workers who are laid off to the wage change of similar workers whose
plant was shut down. Conditional on workers’ prior characteristics and reason for
displacement, laid off workers suffer worse reemployment outcomes because of the
negative signal.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) and numerous other papers which follow it imagine
a world in which employers learn about a worker’s uni-dimensional “ability,” which
is equally applicable to any potential job. But a range of recent work argues that
rather than being specific to a single job at a single firm or generally applicable
across any job, worker productivity might be specific to an industry (Neal (1995)),
occupation (Kambourov and Manovskii (2009)), or the tasks performed in an oc-
cupation (Poletaev and Robinson (2008); Lazear (2009)). Many skills and abilities
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might reasonably be expected to have different importance in different situations.
For example reading comprehension might be most important for a lawyer, still
very important for a business analyst, and least important for a short order cook. If
incumbent employers learn about their employees’ productivity, as in Gibbons and
Katz (1991), then it is an interesting question whether this information pertains to
task specific or to general productivity.
I explore this issue by examining how the lemons effect varies with the sim-
ilarity of the tasks performed in the previous and current jobs. I use measures of
task similarity between occupations from Autor (2013) to classify the task overlap
between workers’ pre- and post-displacement jobs. I show that the measured lemons
effect is larger in magnitude for workers who perform different tasks in their new
jobs. This pattern provides new, if suggestive, evidence on the nature of asymmetric
information in labor markets.
Next, I show that what Gibbons and Katz term the lemons effect is in fact, in
the form that they consider, driven by a recall bias which is correlated with wage loss.
Workers who were laid off are more likely than workers displaced by plant closing
to forget their job loss. And the measured lemons effect is largest for those workers
reporting displacement longest ago. This suggests that the method of comparing
the reemployment wages of laid off and exogenously displaced workers does not
give consistent point estimates of the population conditional average difference in
reemployment wages between laid off and exogenously displaced workers i.e. (the
true “lemons effect”).
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the CPS
99
Displaced Workers Supplement data and presents the evidence that the lemons effect
is larger among workers who find reemployment in jobs requiring a different set of
skills. In Section 3.3, I show that the measured level of the lemons effect is due to
recall bias. Subsection 3.3.4 reconciles these two pieces of evidence, and Section 3.4
concludes.
3.2 The “Lemons Effect” and Task Specificity in the Labor Market
3.2.1 The CPS Displaced Workers Supplement
In this chapter, I use the CPS Displaced Worker Supplement (DWS) from the
years 1996-2008. The DWS is a supplement to the monthly CPS, fielded every two
years, that asks workers who have been displaced from a job in any of the past three
years a series of extra questions about their displacement and their previous em-
ployment. Thus, I observe workers who were displaced in the years 1993-2007. The
data include information on displaced workers’ previous employment and, crucially,
their reason for displacement. Following Gibbons and Katz (1991), I restrict my
sample to male workers aged 21-60 who are displaced from private, full-time, non-
union, non-farm employment outside the construction industry and are currently
reemployed full time at a wage of at least $75 (2006 dollars) per week.1 Also follow-
ing the literature, I consider workers who report displacement because their “plant
or company closed down” to be the comparison group and workers who report dis-
placement due to “insufficient work” or “position or shift abolished” to be laid off.
1Gibbons and Katz (1991) use a wage cutoff of $40, which is roughly the equivalent in 1986
dollars.
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Note that following this literature, all workers in my sample were displaced.
Simple summary statistics for the CPS DWS data are reported in Table 3.1.
Displaced workers on average find reemployment at wages that are nearly 7% lower.
This is consistent with work by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) and von
Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2009) which show large and persistent wage losses
for displaced workers.2 This wage loss is also skewed, since the median wage loss for
displaced workers is only 2%. Displaced workers have an average of nearly 5 years
of tenure in this sample, and a median of 2.5 years of tenure. Displaced workers
have lower tenure than males as a whole, whose median tenure has ranged from 3.9
to 4.7 between 2002 and 2012 (Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012)). The average and
median education of displaced workers are both about 14 years.
Table 3.2 presents sample averages broken out by the reason for workers’ dis-
placement. The standard error of the mean is presented in parentheses below each
mean. Workers who are laid off were much less likely to be notified of their dis-
placement: 26% compared to 49%. Laid off workers were modestly more educated.
They also had lower tenure by 5.5 to 4.2 years on average. As discussed later, there
is evidence of variation in the extent of recall bias by reason for displacement in
this table. Workers displaced by plant closing report their layoffs longer ago (2.0
2Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan and von Wachter, Song, and Manchester find substantially
larger earnings losses (of about 25 to 30%) and document that these losses are persistent. These
point estimates are not directly comparable to those from the DWS for at least three reasons. First,
they analyze “mass-layoffs,” where firms with at least 50 employees lay off at least 30% of their
work force. These workers likely experience displacement in a worse local economy than workers
in the DWS. DWS workers who are laid off or who experienced the closing of a small plant might
be located in relatively healthy local economies. Second, the DWS measures the average weekly
wage upon reemployment, while the work on mass-layoffs uses measures of quarterly earnings. To
the extent that part of the effect of a displacement comes on the hours margin, this would only be
reflected in the wage losses in the mass-layoffs framework.
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Table 3.1: Summary of CPS Displaced Worker Supplements from 1996-2008
Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max
Log(Previous Wage) 6.63 0.63 6.59 4.787 8.199
Log(Current Wage) 6.56 0.63 6.51 4.523 8.149
Log Wage Change -0.067 0.45 -0.023 -2.725 2.331
Notice of Displacement 0.35 0.48 0 0 1
Non-White 0.12 0.32 0 0 1
Married 0.65 0.48 1 0 1
Education (yr.) 13.9 2.41 14 0 20
Pot. Exp. at Displacement (yr.) 17.2 10.1 17 0 45.50
Tenure at Displacement (yr.) 4.75 5.95 2.50 0 38
Years Since Displacement 1.94 0.82 2 1 3
Skill Overlap 0.60 0.51 0.82 -0.943 1
Observations 4501
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the sample of male workers
in the 1996-2008 CPS Displaced Workers Supplement as defined in the text.
compared to 1.9) years ago on average.
In order to show that my sample is similar to the earlier DWS, I reproduce
Gibbons and Katz (1991)’s main results for my sample and compare my results to
those in their paper in Table 3.3. In this table, the previous, current, and change in
log wages are regressed on a set of controls for marital status, race, region, previous
occupation and industry, schooling, years since displacement dummies, a quadratic
in potential experience and a cubic spline in previous tenure with breaks at 1, 2, 3,
and 6 years. The coefficients presented in the table are the coefficient on the layoff
dummy in regressions where the sample group (the whole sample or only white or
blue collar workers) changes in the rows and the outcome variable (log of previous,
current, or relative changes in wages) changes in columns. In their sample, Gibbons
and Katz (1991) find an effect of 4.0% for the whole sample and 5.5% among white
collar workers on wage changes. By comparison, I find an effect of 2.5% for the
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Table 3.2: Summary of CPS Displaced Worker Supplements by reason
for displacement
Plant Closing Layoff Total
Log(Previous Wage) 6.612 6.646 6.632
(0.0146) (0.0122) (0.00935)
Log(Current Wage) 6.549 6.575 6.565
(0.0147) (0.0121) (0.00934)
Log Wage Change -0.0630 -0.0705 -0.0675
(0.0100) (0.00888) (0.00667)
Notice of Displacement 0.485 0.260 0.351
(0.0117) (0.00846) (0.00711)
Non-White 0.123 0.115 0.118
(0.00771) (0.00617) (0.00482)
Married 0.661 0.635 0.645
(0.0111) (0.00929) (0.00713)
Education (yr.) 13.63 14.01 13.86
(0.0575) (0.0458) (0.0359)
Pot. Exp. at Displacement (yr.) 17.51 17.03 17.22
(0.238) (0.193) (0.150)
Tenure at Displacement (yr.) 5.517 4.225 4.746
(0.151) (0.107) (0.0887)
Years Since Displacement 2.004 1.891 1.936
(0.0194) (0.0156) (0.0122)
Skill Overlap 0.613 0.588 0.598
(0.0134) (0.0108) (0.00839)
Observations 1815 2686 4501
Note: This table presents averages of the characteristics of male workers
in the CPS Displaced Workers Supplement as defined in Gibbons and
Katz (1991). The sample is the Displaced Workers Supplements from
1996-2008. Standard errors of the estimate of the mean are presented
in parenthesis below each average.
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whole sample and 4.1% among white collar workers. Most of my coefficients are
within sampling error of their counterparts from Gibbons and Katz (1991)’s paper.
3.2.2 Task Specificity of Human Capital: Recent Work
In seminal work, Becker (1962) argued that there are two types of human
capital: human capital which is “general” and can be applied to any job, and human
capital which is “specific” and useful only when applied to a specific job. More
recent work has refined this concept significantly. Neal (1995) showed that workers
who were displaced from their jobs had much more favorable job outcomes if they
were able to find new employment in the same industry. This suggests that human
capital is not just specific to a firm, but is specific to all firms in the same industry.
Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) show that experience in the same occupation is
relatively more important for explaining wage profiles than overall tenure or tenure
in the same industry.
Lazear (2009) refines this idea further, arguing that rather than being general-
izable between jobs or specific to a particular job, human capital consists of “skills,”
which represent the effectiveness with which a worker performs “tasks,” or aspects
of a particular job. Different jobs require different combinations of tasks, so workers’
productivity at a particular job is determined by their productivity in the particular
combination of tasks required at the job. This approach yields strong predictions
for wage changes as workers progress through their careers. When workers change
jobs, their wage at a new job depends on their productivity at the bundle of tasks
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Table 3.3: The wage effect of a layoff compared to a plant closing in two different
samples
(a) 1996-2008 DWS Sample
Current Sample
Previous Current Change
Whole Sample 0.038∗ 0.013 -0.025
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
White Collar 0.031 -0.014 -0.045∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.018)
Blue Collar 0.028 0.038 0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
(b) 1984 and 1986 DWS Sample
Gibbons and Katz
Previous Current Change
Whole Sample 0.017 -0.021 -0.040∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
White Collar -0.0094 -0.064∗ -0.055∗
(0.024) (0.029) (0.028)
Blue Collar 0.022 0.0023 -0.024
(0.017) (0.021) (0.022)
Note: All regressions include controls for marital status, race, re-
gion, previous occupation and industry, schooling, a quadratic in
potential experience and a cubic spline in previous tenure with
breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years. Regressions of wage change and
current wage include dummies for years since displacement. These
sample in these tables includes workers who are aged 21-60, were
displaced from private, full-time, non-union, non-farm employment
outside the construction industry and are currently reemployed full
time at a wage of at least $75 (2006 dollars) per week. Panel (a)
is from the author’s calculations for the 1996-2008 DWS samples,
while Panel (b) is reproduced from Table 3 of Gibbons and Katz
(1991).
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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at the new job. Their wages will be lower than their wages at the old job to the
extent that each job requires different tasks.
Several relatively recent papers operationalize the Lazear approach and find
that the task-specificity of human capital is a useful concept for explaining patterns
of job change and wage growth in the labor market. Gathmann and Schönberg
(2010) measure the task inputs to particular occupations using the German Quali-
fication and Career Survey. This survey asks workers to report the degree to which
each of a variety of tasks is used in their job. Gathmann and Schönberg calculate the
overlap between two jobs based on the overlap between the vector of task weights for
each job. They find that workers typically move to jobs requiring similar skills, and
that workers get paid more when they have previous tenure in jobs that required
similar skills. They also show that workers are more likely to make more drastic
career changes earlier in their careers, before they have accumulated substantial skill
at the tasks involved in their job. Poletaev and Robinson (2008) perform a related
analysis in the United States. Because there are no large nationally representative
data sources with worker-level information on tasks performed in jobs in the United
States, Poletaev and Robinson use information on the tasks performed in occupa-
tions from from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. They find that workers who
are reemployed in occupations that have different principal task requirements have
worse reemployment outcomes.
To the extent workers face a wage cost of changing tasks, those who are most
able to avoid this cost will be the most likely to do so. The characteristics of workers
who change tasks are relatively unexplored. While it is possible that selection on
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unobservables related to general productivity is able to explain part of the relation-
ship between task switching and wage loss, this story alone cannot be the only story.
With only general and firm specific human capital, the only reason that a worker
might would choose to perform particular tasks in a new job would be related to
preferences. Wage differentials related to productivity might incentivize the most
unobservably productive workers to take jobs performing the same tasks, generating
selection which augments the initial wage difference.
3.2.3 Employer Learning, Tasks, and the “Lemons Effect”
Gibbons and Katz (1991) argue that if firms have private information on the
productivity of individual workers, they will chose to lay off those with the lowest
productivity in their jobs. To the extent that outside firms are uncertain about the
workers’ productivity, they will interpret the layoff as a negative signal about the
worker’s quality. Gibbons and Katz show that workers who are laid off in the CPS
DWS are reemployed at lower wages than their peers who are displaced by a plant
closing. To the extent that all workers involved in a plant closing lose their job at
the same time, there is no negative signal about the quality of a particular worker.
Thus Gibbons and Katz argue that the difference in reemployment wages between
workers who were laid off and whose plant closed down is the informational effect
of a layoff.
But this model of employer learning has a very specific conception of what
employers do not know about employees–employers learn about workers’ unobserved
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one dimensional ability. In light of the work on the task specificity of human capital
(discussed in the previous section), it is interesting to explore the meaning of this
signal for employers. Are employers learning about a simple measure of employee
“ability” which augments productivity in every task? Or are they learning about
employee productivity in the range of tasks performed in the previous job?
The lemons effect could conceivably be either a signal about a workers’ pro-
ductivity in any job or a signal about workers’ productivity at the tasks performed
in the current job. In the latter case, the signal of a layoff should have a different
impact on wages depending on the tasks performed at another job. In the case of
specific skills, for example, firms might learn how consistent and fast workers are
in routine, manual tasks by observing worker productivity over a long period of
time (e.g. Mas and Moretti (2009)), or how adaptive, resourceful, and cheerful an
employee is in non-routine interpersonal interactions with clients. Employers alter-
natively might learn about worker’s problem solving ability, resourcefulness, or work
ethic, which are characteristics that would likely prove useful in any job. Realisti-
cally, the signal which the labor market observes might be about some combination
of these two types of skills. The differential impact of a layoff versus a plant closing
on reemployment wages should then depend on the relative importance of the signal
for skills which are either general or task specific as well as the tasks performed at
the old and new job.
In the next few paragraphs, building on Greenwald (1986), I lay out a frame-
work for thinking about how the measured lemons effect should depend on the task
similarity of the previous and current job. From this, I draw predictions as to
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how the difference in reemployment wages between workers displaced by layoffs and
plant closings should depend on the similarity of tasks performed at the new job
and the old job and whether the information contained in a layoff is about general
or task-specific productivity. 3
In the Greenwald model, incumbent employers know workers’ individual pro-
ductivity and offer wages equal to their marginal products. All workers receive an
exogenous shock to their utility from staying at the same job. Thus the workers who
leave are those who have some combination of a dislike of their current job and those
who are low ability and so receive low wage offers. Outside employers know that the
workers who change jobs are those who received low wage offers from their previous
employers because the previous employer knew that they were unproductive. But
outside employers do not know workers’ individual productivities, and only observe
whether or not each worker was laid off. Since all laid off workers appear identical
to the outside firm, each laid off employee receives the same wage offer. Since this
offer is equal to the average marginal productivity of movers, it is below the average
offer level of stayers.
Now consider a simple case where there are only two types of outside employ-
ers. One outside employer requires exactly the same set of tasks as the incumbent
employer. The other requires completely different tasks. How does the lemons effect
depend on the task similarity in the previous and current job? First consider the
situation where the lemons effect pertains to general productivity in any job, so a
3While Greenwald (1986) develops a formal model, I discuss only the intuition behind extending
this model. I leave a formal extension for future work.
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layoff means that the worker will be less productive in any job, on average, than a
worker displaced by plant closing. The lemons effect here should not depend on the
tasks required.4 Because the lemons effect speaks to productivity in any job, laid
off workers will receive wage offers which are lower than their exogenously displaced
counterparts, no matter what tasks are performed. This makes sense if being laid off
from a job suggests that a worker lacks motivation, and so would be less productive
in any other job, no matter what tasks he performed. Here, the magnitude of the
lemons effect will not depend on the similarity of task content between jobs.
The other case to consider is where the information effect of layoffs pertains
only to the specific set of tasks performed at the previous job. If workers choose jobs
which require completely different tasks, then whether a worker was laid off is irrele-
vant for wages. Employers hiring for different tasks know that the worker displaced
by layoff was less productive at the old job compared to her colleague displaced by
plant closing. But since the new job requires the performance of completely different
tasks, this has no effect on wages. By contrast, if displaced workers choose to take
jobs utilizing similar tasks, then the layoff is again a meaningful signal. Here, the
lemons effect will be larger in magnitude when workers use similar tasks in their
next job than when they use different tasks.
This simple discussion suggests that different underlying mechanisms for the
lemons effect have very different empirical implications for how the lemons effect
4This requires some assumption about why workers might choose to take each type of outside
jobs. I assume that each job will pay the expected marginal product to workers, conditional on
their reason for displacement. Workers also have some preference for performing similar or different
tasks, so that workers consider aspects other than wages when deciding on which potential job to
take.
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should depend on the degree of task overlap.5 If the lemons effect is bigger for
workers taking jobs requiring more similar tasks, this is a sign of learning about
specific tasks. If the lemons effect is constant across the types of tasks employed,
then this can be interpreted as evidence of symmetrical learning about general skills
which contribute equally to productivity in any job. The relative importance of
learning about specific and general productivity is an empirical question, which I
address in the work that follows.
3.2.4 Measuring Task Requirements in Occupations
To measure the skill content of occupations, I follow Autor (2013) and Ace-
moglu and Autor (2011). Acemoglu and Autor consolidate the very large num-
ber of aspects of occupations contained in the Occupational Information Network’s
(O*NET) Work Activities and Work Context Importance scales to only 6 different
dimensions of tasks required.6 They then map these skill requirements to both the
Census 2000 and Standard Occupational Classifications. For each occupation, there
is a measure of the extent to which jobs require the performance of both routine
and non-routine cognitive, manual, and interpersonal tasks, for a total of 6 different
5In future work, a formal foundation can be laid for this intuitive discussion.
6Autor (2013) breaks tasks down into six categories: non-routine cognitive analytic, non-routine
cognitive interpersonal, routine cognitive, routine manual, non-routine manual physical, and non-
routine manual interpersonal. Non-routine cognitive analytical tasks include things like creative
thinking and interpreting information for others. Non-routine cognitive interpersonal tasks include
guiding and motivating others and establishing relationships. Routine cognitive tasks consist of
things where there is a high importance of repeating the same task and being exact or accurate.
Routine manual tasks are those where workers control machines and spend time making repetitive
motions. Non-routine manual physical tasks require a greater degree of physical ability, and
include operating vehicles, using tools with one’s hands, and spatial orientation. Non-routine
manual interpersonal tasks include assisting and caring for others.
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dimensions of task intensity.7 These measures of each dimension of task intensity in
each occupation are then standardized to be zero mean and unit variance. I merge
these measures of task intensity at the 3 digit occupation level into the CPS DWS
sample discussed in Section 3.2.1.
Table 3.4 presents sample averages of skill inputs as well as other variables
separately for white and blue collar pre-displacement jobs. The differences between
workers of different collars are much as expected. The average blue collar job has
0.25 standard deviations less need for non-routine cognitive skills than the average
job. By contrast, the average white collar job has 0.76 standard deviations more
need for these skills. This is consistent with the understanding of white collar jobs
as requiring a greater degree of intellectual problem solving. White collar jobs also
require significantly more non-routine interpersonal tasks, which include things like
teaching and explaining concepts to others. While both white and blue collar jobs
require similar amounts of routine cognitive inputs, blue collar jobs require much
more routine manual as well as non-routine physical tasks. This is very much as
expected: blue collar jobs inherently require physical tasks. White collar jobs require
more non-routine manual interpersonal tasks.
The overlap between jobs is defined as a simple normalized dot product of
the task vectors required at each job. So if the task requirement of the initial job
is ~v0, and the task requirement of the current job is ~v1, then the overlap in skill
requirements is given by:
7It is worth mentioning that there is still considerable heterogeneity which remains within these
task definitions. For example, while both lawyers and engineers have jobs intensive in non-routine
cognitive analytic tasks, it is likely that transitioning between these two occupations would result
in considerable human capital loss.
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Table 3.4: Summary of skill measures by worker collar in the CPS Dis-
placed Worker Supplement
Blue Collar White Collar Total
Log(Previous Wage) 6.326 6.926 6.675
(0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0105)
Log Wage Change -0.0541 -0.0901 -0.0751
(0.0114) (0.00952) (0.00730)
Education (yr.) 12.41 15.05 13.95
(0.0531) (0.0452) (0.0406)
Pot. Exp. at Displacement (yr.) 17.51 17.37 17.43
(0.274) (0.209) (0.167)
Tenure at Displacement (yr.) 4.161 5.238 4.788
(0.142) (0.136) (0.0991)
Years Since Displacement 1.898 1.983 1.947
(0.0211) (0.0176) (0.0135)
Skill Overlap 0.621 0.582 0.598
(0.0126) (0.0112) (0.00839)
Non-Routine Cognitive Analytic -0.248 0.755 0.336
(0.0187) (0.0180) (0.0154)
Non-Routine Interpersonal -0.370 0.468 0.118
(0.0217) (0.0224) (0.0173)
Routine Cognitive 0.0819 -0.0630 -0.00244
(0.0196) (0.0180) (0.0133)
Routine Manual 0.790 -0.484 0.0484
(0.0231) (0.0174) (0.0174)
Non-Routine Manual Physical 0.922 -0.468 0.113
(0.0252) (0.0184) (0.0189)
Non-Routine Manual Interpersonal -0.660 0.0739 -0.233
(0.0204) (0.0181) (0.0149)
Observations 1515 2111 3626
Note: This table presents summary statistics by “collar” of employment in
a worker’s pre-displacement job, as defined in Gibbons and Katz (1991) for
the CPS Displaced Workers Supplement from 1996-2008. Standard errors of
the mean are reported in parentheses. The measures of skill content come
from the files that are publicly available at http://economics.mit.edu/
faculty/dautor/data/acemoglu.
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Skill Overlap =
~v0 · ~v1
(‖~v0‖‖~v1‖)1/2
(3.1)
Gathmann and Schönberg use a different measure of task intensity based on
how often workers perform a given task in their job. Thus their overlap measure is
strictly positive and has a more natural interpretation as the extent to which the
bundle of skills required is similar between the two jobs–this value can be between 0
(indicating no overlap whatsoever) and 1 (indicating complete overlap). By contrast,
my measure expresses only a relative amount of overlap and runs from −1 to 1.
It is also worth comparing this measure to that of Poletaev and Robinson
(2008). They use the same underlying Dictionary of Occupational Titles information
as Autor. But instead of making an argument about how to construct the relevant
low-dimensional skill vector, they use factor analysis to let the data determine a low-
dimensional vector to use. They use two definitions of thresholds for “switching”
skill requirements of jobs based on whether the new job uses the same principal skill
component most intensively or not and whether or not there was a big change in
the magnitude of the importance of the principal component. To the extent that
the work of Autor, Murnane, and Levy (2003) was successful in identifying the key
components of tasks performed at jobs, the two approaches are likely very similar.
Note that the measure of overlap between pre- and post-displacement jobs is
relatively similar for white and blue collar workers. The summary statistics in Table
3.1 show that the sample average overlap in tasks is reasonably high, at 0.60. But
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some workers do take jobs with completely (or nearly completely) opposite task
intensities, as the sample minimum is close to −1. Of course, any worker who does
not change 3 digit occupations will by definition have a task overlap measure of 1.
Table 3.5 presents summary statistics by whether a worker found reemploy-
ment in a job requiring a mix of tasks with greater or less than the median degree of
overlap. Workers who find a new job that has low task overlap with their previous
job appear to have wage changes upon reemployment that are (statistically signifi-
cantly) about 6% worse than those who find reemployment in a new job with high
task overlap. Other than this wage difference, workers who have high task overlap
in their jobs pre- and post-displacement seem quite similar to those with low task
overlap. They appear to be modestly positively selected on characteristics related to
wages, just on the edge of statistical significance. For example, high overlap workers
are about three percentage points more likely to be married, and have about 0.1
additional years of education.
Notice that the degree of task overlap does not seem to be strongly related to
either the probability of being laid off or the time since workers report displacement.
In light of the evidence discussed below in Section 3.3 this is important. Workers
who are laid off are more likely to forget displacement than those displaced by
plant closing. And this forgetting appears to drive the measured lemons effect.
Fortunately, the task overlap between workers’ previous and current jobs does not
seem to be strongly correlated with when workers were displaced or their reason for
displacement.8
8A simple linear probability model regressing the probability of being laid off on the degree of
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Table 3.5: Summary of worker characteristics by task overlap between pre- and
post-displacement jobs
Low Skill Overlap High Skill Overlap Total
Log(Previous Wage) 6.607 6.743 6.675
(0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0105)
Log(Current Wage) 6.501 6.699 6.600
(0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0105)
Log Wage Change -0.106 -0.0439 -0.0751
(0.0107) (0.00992) (0.00730)
Laid Off 0.617 0.582 0.600
(0.0114) (0.0116) (0.00814)
Notice of Displacement 0.344 0.374 0.359
(0.0112) (0.0114) (0.00797)
Non-White 0.132 0.119 0.125
(0.00794) (0.00761) (0.00550)
Married 0.632 0.660 0.646
(0.0113) (0.0111) (0.00794)
Education (yr.) 13.88 14.02 13.95
(0.0534) (0.0613) (0.0406)
Pot. Exp. at Displacement (yr.) 16.74 18.12 17.43
(0.239) (0.233) (0.167)
Tenure at Displacement (yr.) 4.774 4.802 4.788
(0.142) (0.138) (0.0991)
Years Since Displacement 1.974 1.921 1.947
(0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0135)
Skill Overlap 0.225 0.972 0.598
(0.0112) (0.00123) (0.00839)
Observations 1814 1812 3626
Note: This table presents summary statistics by the degree of overlap in task require-
ments between a displaced worker’s pre- and post-displacement jobs, as defined by
equation (3.1). Standard errors of the mean are reported in parentheses.
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3.2.5 The Lemons Effect and Task Overlap
Table 3.6 presents the results of estimating the standard lemons effect equation
from Gibbons and Katz while allowing the effect to vary by the measure of task
overlap discussed in Section 3.2.4. This estimating equation is presented in Equation
3.2.
∆ logw = β0Layoff + β1Layoff* Skill Overlap + β2Skill Overlap + γX + ε (3.2)
The coefficient on Layoff in the first row of Table 3.6 is −0.05 and represents the
lemons effect when a worker is reemployed in a job consisting of tasks that are
perfectly orthogonal to those of the previous job. The coefficient indicates that laid
off workers who find a new job requiring orthogonal tasks will earn 5% lower wages
than a similar worker displaced by plant closing making the same transition. This
coefficient is large compared to the analogous estimate of the main lemons effect
estimates in Table 3.3a of −0.02. If workers are reemployed with perfect overlap,
the lemons effect is then given by the sum of the coefficients in the first two rows,
which is very close to zero. Indeed, the p-value from a test that these two coefficients
sum to zero is reported in the table, and fails to reject that hypothesis. That there
is a positive, significant coefficient on Skill Overlap is intuitive. Decreasing the task
overlap between a worker’s old and new job through the entire range from 1 to −1
overlap has an insignificant coefficient suggesting that workers finding reemployment with complete
overlap were about two percentage points less likely to be laid off than those finding reemployment
in a job using perfectly orthogonal tasks.
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Table 3.6: The effect of a layoff on reemploy-
ment wages and degree of task overlap
∆ log(w )
Layoff -0.052∗
(0.024)
Layoff * Overlap 0.061∗
(0.030)
Overlap 0.049∗
(0.024)
p(Layoff + Layoff * Overlap = 0) 0.592
N 3626
Note: This table presents results of a re-
gression of wage changes on an indicator
of whether a worker was laid off interacted
with the distance in task overlap between the
worker’s previous and current occupation of
employment. The regression includes controls
for marital status, race, region, previous oc-
cupation and industry, schooling, years since
displacement, a quadratic in potential expe-
rience and a cubic spline in previous tenure
with breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years. They use
data from the 1996-2008 CPS DWS, consider-
ing only workers who were displaced from full-
time, private sector, non-agricultural, non-
self employed jobs paying at least $75 2006
dollars per week and are reemployed in simi-
lar jobs.
would result in 10% lower reemployment wages.9 This is consistent with the work
of Neal (1995), Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), Poletaev and Robinson (2008)
and others which find that reemployment wages are higher for workers who find
jobs more similar to their old jobs, based on whether reemployment is in the same
industry or occupation.
The estimated coefficient on the interaction between layoff and task overlap is
9This estimate comes from multiplying the point estimate 0.049 by the change in overlap given
by 1− (−1) = 2.
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the main parameter of interest, and the fact that it is positive is quite an interesting
result. The estimated coefficient suggests that the lemons effect is more important
when workers end up in jobs using different tasks than when they end up in jobs
using similar tasks. This is not consistent with the scenario, discussed above, where
the layoff is a signal about general productivity. In that situation, we would expect
the coefficient to be zero. It is also inconsistent with the scenario where the layoff
is a signal about task-specific productivity. In that situation, a lemons effect would
not exist when there is no task overlap. But the lemons effect would exist when
workers find reemployment performing similar tasks. This would suggest a negative
coefficient on the interaction term. This presents a puzzle for the simple framework
discussed above. Future theoretical work might explain this result. A particularly
promising direction might include introducing an informational asymmetry between
firms who hire workers utilizing similar and different tasks. An informational ad-
vantage might help to explain why firms who reemploy workers using similar tasks
pay more: they are better able to tell which workers are lemons. Thus they pay
the keep the best lemons and pay them more, while the most severe lemons end up
taking jobs using different tasks and receive lower wages.
This empirical analysis is thought-provoking in that it sheds some light on
the way that employers learn asymmetrically about specific versus general employee
productivity in the labor market. But some caution should be used in drawing
conclusions. One reason among many for this caution is that it is possible that
recall bias is playing a role in the measured lemons effect. In the next section, I
turn to the role of recall bias in the estimation of the lemons effect more broadly.
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3.3 The Role of Recall Bias in Estimating the “Lemons Effect”
Recall bias, in which a survey respondent answers questions erroneously due
either to forgetfulness or cognitive bias, can be crucially important in any study
that relies on retrospective survey data. The seriousness of the problem depends
on the length of respondent recall periods and on the correlation between forgetting
and outcomes of interest. In the case of the CPS DWS, respondents are asked
about displacement events that occurred up to five years before the survey date in
Supplements fielded earlier than 1996, and up to three years before the survey date
in Supplements fielded 1996 or later.
At present, I am interested in measuring the “lemons effect,” or the conditional
difference in log wage changes between workers who are displaced due to layoffs
compared to those displaced due to plant closings. Forgetting is likely to matter
here since whether workers remember being displaced is likely related to their pre-
and post- displacement wages. The potential problem is that laid off workers who
subsequently find relatively well-paying jobs are more likely to forget displacement
(and not be in the sample) than are workers who find relatively low-paying jobs.
Because workers who are laid off with good outcomes are missing from the sample,
the measured lemons effect will be biased towards more negative values. This story
is originally due to Robert Topel and mentioned in Gibbons and Katz (1991). It is
important to keep in mind that this story is for workers displaced by layoffs relative
to plant closings. The implicit assumption here is that workers displaced by plant
closings are more likely to have relatively constant memories over time. This is
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reasonable if a plant closing is a big event for the entire community and not just for
the lone displaced worker.
I examine the role of recall bias in the DWS sample years 1996-2008, and find
that it plays an important role. I tabulate the number of workers reporting dis-
placement according to the time since their reported displacement and their reason
for displacement. This tabulation shows that workers who were laid off appear to
forget displacements much more quickly than workers whose plants closed. While
this initially appears to be less true among high tenure workers, I show that af-
ter attempting to account for selection bias by limiting the sample to workers who
are reemployed quickly, high tenure workers also appear to forget displacement at
similar rates to low tenure workers.
I check to see whether the lemons effect differs by the number of years since
displacement took place. When I allow the lemons effect to vary by years since
displacement, I find that the measured lemons effect is indistinguishable from zero
for workers displaced one or two years ago, but is around 7% for those displaced
three years ago. Allowing the lemons effect differ for high and low tenure workers,
as Gibbons and Katz do, I find the same thing: there is no lemons effect for workers
displaced one or two years ago, but the effect is 12% for those displaced three years
ago.
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3.3.1 Measurement of the “Lemons Effect” in Other Studies
In their classic paper, Gibbons and Katz (1991) develop a model which pre-
dicts that because of signalling effects, workers who are laid off will experience more
adverse wage changes than workers whose company or plant closes. A literature has
developed that attempts to measure this “lemons effect” in different countries and
using different data. Among these papers are Doiron (1995) for Canada, Stevens
(1997) using the PSID, Krashinsky (2002) using the NLSY, Grund (1999) for Ger-
many, and Song (2007) using the 2000 and 2002 DWS.10
Because of its large sample size and representativeness, the DWS is a leading
candidate to study the lemons effect (indeed, Gibbons and Katz used it in their
seminal work), but because of the three year recall period, there is a risk of recall
bias. Gibbons and Katz considered this possibility in their work, but concluded
that it was unlikely for three reasons: recall bias 1) would not explain the larger
effect for white compared to blue collar workers 2) would suggest, counter to their
findings, that the lemons effect should grow with time since displacement and 3)
would be less of a problem among high tenure workers, for whom they observed the
biggest effect. Evans and Leighton (1995) study recall bias directly in the DWS
using the overlapping nature of the 1984-1990 samples and find that workers forget
displacements at a rate of 17.6% per year. Oyer (2004) attempts a validation of the
DWS by asking the DWS survey instruments to workers displaced from a financial
services firm and matching their responses the “truth” using payroll data. Though
10Gibbons and Katz (1991), Doiron (1995) and Song (2007) use retrospective supplements to
cross-sectional surveys, while the other authors use panel data sets that find very few displacements
but have more information about the careers of displaced workers.
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he does not specifically address the rate of forgetting, he does find that workers recall
their pre-displacement tenure and reason for displacement accurately but tend to
overstate their earnings.
Song (2007) looks specifically at the question of whether recall bias drives the
measured lemons effect in Gibbons and Katz (1991). When restricting the sample
to those workers displaced in the last two years, he finds that the lemons effect is
the same among white collar workers but grows among blue collar workers.11 Thus,
implicitly Song finds that blue collar workers are more likely to forget displacements
that resulted in very bad wage changes, which is at odds with a recall bias story
where workers forget displacements that result in mild wage changes. Song (2007)
also finds that when the wage-tenure profile at the previous job is allowed to differ
by the reason for which the worker was displaced, laid off workers have a steeper
wage-tenure profile and the lemons effect disappears.
3.3.2 Recall Bias
I begin by demonstrating the existence of recall bias and presenting sugges-
tive evidence that it might play a major role in the estimation of the lemons effect.
In Table 3.7 I present simple tabulations of the number of workers reporting dis-
placement one, two, or three years ago and meeting sample selection criteria by
whether they were laid off or not. Workers displaced due to plant closings appear
to report displacement at roughly equal rates in the last three years: 615, 578, and
11The problem with mitigating recall bias in this way is that using workers displaced recently
accentuates the selection bias from only considering workers who have found new jobs. Indeed, as
a robustness check, Gibbons and Katz consider only workers reporting displacement longer than
two years ago.
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Table 3.7: Displacements reported in 1996-2008 CPS
DWS by time since displacement and reason for displace-
ment
Years Since Displacement Plant Closing Layoff Total
1 Year Ago 615 1042 1657
2 Years Ago 578 896 1474
3 Years Ago 622 748 1370
Total 1815 2686 4501
Note: Tabulation of 1996-2008 DWS by Reported Time
Since Displacement and Reason for Displacement. This
table includes workers who are aged 21-60, were displaced
from private, full-time, non-union, non-farm employment
outside the construction industry and are currently reem-
ployed full time at a wage of at least $75 (2006 dollars)
per week.
622 workers report being displaced by plant closings one, two, and three years ago
respectively. In comparison, laid off workers are more likely to be displaced last
year (1042 workers) than three years ago (748 workers).12 If the true number of
workers displaced one and three years ago is actually similar, there are around 300
“missing” workers who were displaced three years ago but have forgotten about it:
this is a very sizable portion of the sample. Therefore, Table 3.7 suggests that laid
off workers are forgetting displacements at a greater rate than their counterparts
Though it seems that forgetting is taking place, this does not necessarily mean
that recall bias is relevant for the estimation of the lemons effect. To show that
12Fitting a simple exponential model to the count data with controls for years since displacement,
whether a worker was laid off or displaced by plant closing, and the interaction between the
two validates this pattern. Workers displaced by plant closing are 0.5% more likely to report
a displacement each year since displacement, while laid off workers are 17% less likely to report
displacement with each passing year. Assuming that the number of workers reporting displacement
a given number of years ago follows a Poisson distribution also allows a direct test of the statistical
significance of this relationship. Using the Poisson distribution, the expected value of both the
mean and variance are given by the number of counts. Thus there were 1042±32 workers reporting
displacement last year and 748± 27 reporting displacement three years ago, a difference which is
clearly statistically significant.
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recall bias matters, I first see if the measured lemons effect varies by how long ago a
worker reports displacement. Finding that the measured effect is higher for workers
displaced longer ago is consistent with recall bias driving the results, but recall
bias is not the only possible explanation. I consider other possible explanations in
Section 3.3.3.
Table 3.8 presents results of regressions which allow the measured lemons effect
to vary by the time since displacement. I find that the lemons effect is statistically
different from zero only for workers displaced three years ago. In Column 1 of Table
3.8 I repeat the analysis in Table 3.3, but replace the layoff dummy with a set of
layoff × years since displacement interaction dummies. The first column of Table 3.8
shows that laid off workers displaced last year have 2.4% worse wage changes than
their counterparts whose plants closed while laid off workers displaced two years ago
had 1.5% better wage changes. Neither of these estimates is statistically different
from zero. By contrast, laid off workers displaced three years ago have 6.8% (and
statistically significant) worse wage changes. I reject the joint equality of these three
coefficients at the 1% level, but I fail to reject that the lemons effect for workers
displaced one or two years ago is zero. The difference in coefficients between workers
reporting displacement one and three years ago is particularly striking. Because of
the biennial nature of the DWS, workers are reporting displacement in nearly the
same years, yet the layoff coefficient is quite different.13
To attempt to control for recall bias, Gibbons and Katz as well as Song test
13Except for the first and last sample years (1993 and 2007), every odd year is both one and
three years before a DWS.
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whether the lemons effect is different for workers displaced more or less than two
years ago using a Chow test. They fail to reject that the coefficients are different.
Compared to Song in particular, I am able to reject the analogous measure of equal-
ity simply because I have more power. While Song uses only the 2000 and 2002 CPS
DWS, I use five additional surveys. My point estimates are relatively similar, but
I have smaller standard errors thanks to my larger sample. Thus, it appears that
laid off workers workers’ wage changes do differ depending on when a worker has
reported displacement. While it is possible that recall bias has changed between the
sample period in Gibbons and Katz and in this work, the rate of forgetting seems
similar between the two periods.14
Looking at high tenure workers provides a starker test of recall bias for two
reasons. First, Gibbons and Katz find that the lemons effect is larger in magnitude
for high tenure workers, so that classical measurement error is relatively less impor-
tant. Second, high tenure workers should be less susceptible to recall bias than their
low tenure counterparts if longer term jobs are more memorable, so any finding of
recall bias among these workers is less expected. Column 2 of Table 3.8 presents
the layoff coefficients from a wage change regression where the coefficient on layoff
is allowed to differ by years since displacement and whether workers had tenure
above or below the sample median.15 The results show a lemons effect three years
ago of 12.7%, compared to one last year of 1.7%. Again, only the coefficient for
workers displaced three years ago is significant, and I cannot reject the hypothesis
14See Evans and Leighton (1995).
15There are actually 6 layoff coefficients in this model: one for each years since displacement –
tenure level interaction. The coefficients for low tenure workers are all relatively close to zero and
are omitted.
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Table 3.8: The effect of a layoff on reemployment wages by years since
displacement
All High Ten. High Ten. Sample
Layoff * 1 Year Ago -0.024 -0.017 -0.028
(0.022) (0.028) (0.030)
Layoff * 2 Year Ago 0.015 -0.006 0.014
(0.023) (0.028) (0.031)
Layoff * 3 Year Ago -0.068∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.031)
p-Value (Equality of 1, 2, and 3) 0.045 0.003 0.001
p-Value (Equality of 2 and 3) 0.013 0.002 0.000
p-Value (Equality of 1 and 3) 0.171 0.005 0.007
p-Value (1 and 2 Equal 0) 0.444 0.823 0.577
R2 0.083 0.086 0.115
N 4501 4501 2266
Note: Estimates of a log wage change regression where the lemons effect is
allowed to very by years since displacement. The first column reports results
of these regressions for the sample. In the second column, the lemons effect
is also allowed to vary by tenure level, but for brevity only high tenure
coefficients are reported (all coefficients for low tenure workers are close to
zero). The third column estimates the same equation as the first column
except that the sample is restricted to only workers with tenure above the
median. The controls are the same as those presented in Table 3.6.
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
that the lemons effect is zero for workers displaced one or two years ago. I can reject
the equality of these coefficients at the 1% level. Column 3 reproduces Column 1
restricting the sample to only high tenure workers with very similar results.
3.3.3 Robustness of the Recall Bias Finding
An alternative explanation for the results in Table 3.8 is that workers displaced
by plant closings either find stable jobs faster (and accumulate higher tenure and
thus receive higher wages there) or are more effective at job search (and hence
accumulate better match-specific capital) than their laid off counterparts. Thus
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Table 3.9: The effect of a layoff on reemployment wages by years since
displacement using additional controls
All High Ten. High Ten. Sample
Layoff * 1 Year Ago -0.025 -0.019 -0.031
(0.022) (0.028) (0.030)
Layoff * 2 Year Ago 0.017 -0.005 0.016
(0.023) (0.028) (0.031)
Layoff * 3 Year Ago -0.070∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.031)
p-Value (Equality of 1, 2, and 3) 0.031 0.002 0.001
p-Value (Equality of 2 and 3) 0.009 0.001 0.000
p-Value (Equality of 1 and 3) 0.164 0.004 0.007
p-Value (1 and 2 Equal 0) 0.370 0.784 0.516
R2 0.104 0.107 0.133
N 4501 4501 2266
Note: See notes to Table 3.6. In addition, these regressions include a cubic
spline in tenure at a worker’s current job with breaks at one, two, and three
years. It also includes a set of dummies for the number of different jobs that
a worker had since they were displaced.
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
differences in human capital between the two groups of workers would get bigger
over time and the measured lemons effect would grow. This does not appear to be
the case, however. In Table 3.9 I control for a cubic spline in tenure at the current
job and the number of jobs held since displacement. The point estimates in this
table are largely unchanged from Table 3.8
Another potential explanation is that while Table 3.7 (a tabulation of workers
in the sample by the time since displacement and reason for displacement) sug-
gests a role for recall bias among the entire population, high tenure workers are less
susceptible to recall bias. No matter whether a worker has a good or bad reemploy-
ment outcome, one might expect that a worker will be more likely to remember a
job which they held for longer. Yet while recall bias should be less important, the
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lemons effect certainly seems more prominent for high tenure workers, so the pattern
of forgetting in Table 3.7 must still be prominent among high tenure workers. The
analogue to Table 3.7, restricted just to workers with tenure above the median is
reported in Panel 3.10a of Table 3.10. There appears to be almost no forgetting
among high tenure workers: 435 report displacement one year ago compared to 395
three years ago. This suggests a rate of forgetting around 2% per year, much lower
than the 17.6% reported in Evans and Leighton (1995). There is also no forgetting
among workers displaced by plant closing, of whom 328 report displacement from
long-held jobs one year ago and 380 report a similar displacement three years ago
In fact, this apparent uniformity of reports of displacement over time in Table
3.10a masks heterogeneity in recall bias with respect to time spent jobless. In
particular, workers are very likely to remember any form of displacement which left
them jobless for an extended period of time. This is likely one of the main non-
wage determinants of the salience of a job loss. Therefore, no recall bias should be
expected for workers who have no job for a year or more (for example). Whether
these workers were laid off or displaced by a plant closing, they will likely remember
this painful spell of joblessness with great fidelity. Therefore, to the extent that
recall bias exists and differs by reason for displacement, this pattern should hold
more strongly among workers who find reemployment relatively quickly. Table 3.10b
repeats tabulations in Table 3.10a for high tenure workers with jobless spells less
than 13 weeks. In Table 3.10b the differential forgetting pattern reemerges for laid
off workers. There are 346 high tenure workers laid off one year ago compared to
235 three years ago.
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Table 3.10: Displacements reported in 1996-2008 CPS DWS by time since displace-
ment and reason for displacement for workers with at least 30 months of tenure
(a) High Tenure Workers
Years Since Displacement Plant Closing Layoff Total
1 Year Ago 328 435 763
2 Years Ago 320 408 728
3 Years Ago 380 395 775
Total 1028 1238 2266
(b) High Tenure Workers Reemployed within 13 Weeks
Years Since Displacement Plant Closing Layoff Total
1 Year Ago 290 346 636
2 Years Ago 217 270 487
3 Years Ago 255 235 490
Total 762 851 1613
Note: Tabulation of 1996-2008 DWS by Reported Time Since
Displacement and Reason for Displacement. These tables include
workers who are aged 21-60, were displaced from private, full-time,
non-union, non-farm employment outside the construction industry
and are currently reemployed full time at a wage of at least
$75 (2006 dollars) per week. Table 3.10a further restricts the
sample to workers with tenure above the median (2.5 years), while
Table 3.10b restricts the sample to high tenure workers who were
reemployed within 13 weeks.
While it is possible to question whether a substantial number of workers might
forget a job they held for more than 2.5 years, this is not necessarily the only margin
along which recall bias might matter. It is also possible that the language asking
about displacement with the language “did you lose a job” just does not resonate
because the transition might not feel like a job loss in retrospect. A worker who was
laid off from a long-held job but found another good job quickly might remember
the details of the job but recall it as being a voluntary change rather than as being
lost in response to this line of questioning.
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Table 3.11: The effect of a layoff on reemployment wages among workers reemployed
within 13 weeks
All High Ten. High Ten. Sample
Layoff * 1 Year Ago -0.005 -0.000 0.000
(0.023) (0.030) (0.032)
Layoff * 2 Year Ago 0.028 0.027 0.039
(0.027) (0.032) (0.035)
Layoff * 3 Year Ago -0.031 -0.100∗∗ -0.119∗∗
(0.029) (0.034) (0.037)
p-Value (Equality of 1, 2, and 3) 0.332 0.016 0.006
p-Value (Equality of 2 and 3) 0.140 0.006 0.002
p-Value (Equality of 1 and 3) 0.479 0.024 0.015
p-Value (1 and 2 Equal 0) 0.585 0.712 0.532
R2 0.075 0.078 0.111
N 3379 3379 1613
Note: Estimates of a log wage change regression where the lemons effect is
allowed to very by years since displacement with the sample restricted to
workers reemployed at the survey date who found reemployment within 13
weeks of displacement. The first column reports results of these regressions
for the sample. In the second column, the lemons effect is also allowed
to vary by tenure level, but for brevity only high tenure coefficients are
reported. The third column estimates the same equation as the first column
except that the sample is restricted to only workers with tenure above the
median. All regressions include controls for marital status, race, region,
previous occupation and industry, schooling, years since displacement, a
quadratic in potential experience and a cubic spline in previous tenure
with breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6 years. They use data from the 1996-2008
CPS DWS, considering only workers who were displaced from full-time,
private sector, non-agricultural, non-self employed jobs paying at least $75
2006 dollars per week and are reemployed in similar jobs within 13 weeks
of displacement.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001
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So recall bias does appear to exist, even among high tenure workers. But for
this to be an important driver of the lemons effect, the results presented in Section
3.3.2 and Table 3.8 should still apply even if the sample is limited to workers who
found reemployment quickly. Table 3.11 reproduces the basic results in Table 3.8
while limiting the sample to workers reemployed within 13 weeks. Column 1 of Table
3.11 does not restrict the sample to high tenure workers, but presents the analogue
of column 1 of Table 3.8 for workers reemployed quickly. The lemons effect here is no
longer discernible from noise. Columns 2 and 3 look at the lemons effect among the
high tenure sample. Here the pattern of recall bias driving the lemons effect is again
obvious. The lemons effect for high tenure workers reemployed within 13 weeks and
displaced three years ago is 10%, while the lemons effects are indistinguishable from
zero for those reporting job loss one or two years ago.
Song argues that the measured lemons effect is due to differences in the wage-
tenure profile between workers who are laid off and those whose plants close. Song’s
findings are not incompatible with my finding of recall bias. Song argues that laid
off workers have “more to lose” because they have a higher wage-tenure profile. If
laid off workers forget displacement from low wage jobs, those in the sample will
have overwhelmingly high wage jobs. A recall-biased sample of laid off workers will
appear to have “more to lose.” At the same time, it would be difficult for a wage-
tenure profile story to explain the difference in measured lemons effects by years
since displacement. Any difference would have to be due to differences in tenure
between workers displaced at different times, but workers displaced at different times
appear to have relatively similar tenure characteristics.
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A final critique of the results discussed here is that Gibbons and Katz (????)
already considered recall bias explicitly in an unpublished version of their paper,
so the recall bias that I find is due to differences between our samples. Compared
to this unpublished work, I have more power because I have a larger sample size.
While Gibbons and Katz might have had enough power to estimate the lemons
effect, they might still lack the precision to see how the lemons effect varies by time
since reported displacement. I also use seven sample years compared to their two,
and have six overlapping sample years compared to three, so my estimates will be
less likely to pick up effects that are specific to particular years of the samples.
3.3.4 Robustness of Task Specific Relationship to Recall Bias
The evidence from Section 3.3.2 suggests that recall bias has the potential
to bias estimates of the lemons effect. If the lemons effect is biased, this makes
it difficult to interpret the relationship between the lemons effect and task overlap
discussed in Section 3.2. I present evidence that recall bias is not a driver of the
relationship between the magnitude of the lemons effect and the similarity of tasks
required at the reemployment job. While it is important to keep the threats to
estimates from Section 3.3.2 in mind, the results in Table 3.6 provide some thought
provoking suggestive evidence on the role of information in labor markets.
Table 3.12 shows the number of workers in the CPS DWS by their time since
displacement and the degree of overlap between tasks in their previous and current
occupations. While there is some evidence that workers are forgetting displacements
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Table 3.12: The relationship between recall bias and task overlap
Years Since Displacement Low Skill Overlap High Skill Overlap Total
1 Year Ago 612 695 1307
2 Years Ago 638 565 1203
3 Years Ago 564 552 1116
Total 1814 1812 3626
Note: This table presents tabulations of the number of workers report-
ing displacement in the 1996-2008 CPS Displaced Worker Supplements by
whether they found reemployment in occupations requiring tasks that were
more or less similar than the median. The task overlap measure is discussed
in Section 3.2.4. For details on the sample selection, see the notes to Table
3.4.
A χ2-test of independence of time since displacement and task overlap
rejects independence (p = .007), but the relationship is much less important
in magnitude than the relationship between time since displacement and
the reporting of a layoff versus a plant closing in Table 3.7.
here overall, the forgetting does not appear strongly related to task overlap. If
anything, it appears that workers who end up finding jobs requiring similar tasks
(those in the “high overlap” column) forget displacement more quickly. However a
more formal test, where the number of workers reporting displacement in each cell
is modelled with a Poisson regression, fails to reject that high overlap workers are
forgetting displacement more quickly at the 5% level.
If recall bias is important for estimating how the lemons effect varies with task
overlap then the estimated lemons effect should vary with time since displacement.
Table 3.8 allows the lemons effect to vary with time since displacement and shows
that it is larger for workers reporting displacement longer ago. The analogous result
for the interaction with task overlap is presented in Table 3.13. This table presents a
regression of the log wage change on the same set of controls as in Tables 3.6 and 3.8,
while allowing the layoff and task overlap terms to vary with time since displacement.
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The interaction between the lemons effect and time since displacement takes the
value of 0.06 for workers displaced one year ago, 0.10 for those displaced two years
ago, and 0.02 for those displaced three years ago. At the bottom of the table, the
p-test of the joint equality of the interaction coefficients is reported, and equality is
not rejected. By contrast, the analogous test for equality of the layoff coefficient by
time since displacement is rejected in Table 3.8.
3.4 Conclusion: Further Analysis of the “Lemons Effect”
I use measures of the task requirements of occupations to probe how employer
learning as embodied in the lemons effect relates to task-specific abilities. I present
suggestive evidence that the lemons effect is significantly larger for workers who
make large task changes after displacement. Laid off workers switching to jobs
using completely opposite tasks face a lemons effect of 12% of wages, and workers
making a transition one standard deviation greater than average face a 3.6% penalty.
This finding is inconsistent with a simple extension of Greenwald (1986) that would
suggest either that the lemons effect would be smaller for workers making large skill
transitions, or independent of transition size, depending whether employers learn
about, respectively, tasks specific or general productivity.
I also show that conventional estimates of the Gibbons and Katz lemons effect
can largely be explained by recall bias. Workers who were laid off are more likely
to forget their displacement over time if they have good reemployment outcomes.
The entire measured lemons effect in the 1996 to 2008 CPS DWS is driven by those
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Table 3.13: The effect of a layoff on reemployment
wages by time since displacement and task overlap
∆ log(w )
Layoff * Overlap * 1 Year Ago 0.060
(0.048)
Layoff * Overlap * 2 Year Ago 0.095
(0.055)
Layoff * Overlap * 3 Year Ago 0.024
(0.052)
Layoff * Years Since Displacement X
Overlap * Years Since Displacement X
p(Equality of Layoff * Overlap Coefficients) 0.647
Note: Estimates of a log wage change regression where
the lemons effect is allowed to very by years since dis-
placement. The first column reports results of these
regressions for the sample. In the second column, the
lemons effect is also allowed to vary by tenure level, but
for brevity only high tenure coefficients are reported (all
coefficients for low tenure workers are close to zero).
The third column estimates the same equation as the
first column except that the sample is restricted to only
workers with tenure above the median. All regressions
include controls for marital status, race, region, previous
occupation and industry, schooling, years since displace-
ment, a quadratic in potential experience and a cubic
spline in previous tenure with breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 6
years. They use data from the 1996-2008 CPS DWS,
considering only workers who were displaced from full-
time, private sector, non-agricultural, non-self employed
jobs paying at least $75 2006 dollars per week and are
reemployed in similar jobs.
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reporting displacement three years ago. While the level of the lemons effect is driven
by recall bias, the interaction between the lemons effect and the task change after
displacement is not.
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Appendix A
Details on Uncertainty and Parental Investment
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A.1 The Illustrative Model with Quadratic Utility
To see that more risk tolerant parents invest more in their children, notice
that the first order condition in Equation 2.5b can be written in the quadratic case
as:
u′(c1) = (A− 2B · E[H]) · E[Hy]− 2B · var(H) ·
∂var(H)
∂y
(A.1)
Note that greater risk tolerance corresponds to a flatter utility function, or a decrease
in B. As B decreases, the right hand side of Equation A.1 increases. Therefore, the
marginal utility of consumption increases, and so this more risk tolerant individual
will choose lower consumption c1 and higher investment levels y and s.
More risk tolerant parents also invest relatively more in early childhood than
their risk averse peers. To see this, look at the quadratic version of Equation 2.5c:
EVy =EVs
(A− 2BE[H])E[Hy]− 2Bvar(H)
∂var(H)
∂y
= (A.2)
(A− 2BE[H])E[Hs]−2Bvar(H)
∂var(H)
∂s
Marginal utilities with respect to each argument are decreasing with the arguments
if parents are at an interior solution. If risk tolerance increases (i.e. B decreases),
it is possible to see how parents adjust by looking at whether there is a larger effect
on the marginal utility of investment in early childhood or the marginal utility of
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investment in late childhood. If the marginal utility with respect to y increases by
more than the marginal utility with respect to s, then parents must invest more in
y and/or less in s in order for equation A.2 to hold. That is, we need:
− ∂EVy
∂B
> −∂EVs
∂B
2E[H] · E[Hy] + 2var(H) ·
∂var(H)
∂y
> 2E[H] · E[Hs] + 2var(H) ·
∂var(H)
∂s
2E[H] · (E[Hy]− E[Hs]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
) + 2var( H )
(
∂var(H)
∂y
− ∂var(H)
∂s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0 (A.3)
Equation A.3 holds because at the margin time with younger children is more pro-
ductive (an additional unit of time in early childhood increases human capital more
than an additional unit of time in late childhood) and because it is more risky (an
additional unit of investment in early childhood contributes more to risk than a
unit of investment in late childhood). Thus more risk tolerant parents will shift
their time investment profile from late childhood towards early childhood.
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A.2 Risk Tolerance and Time Use: Different Controls
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